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ABSTRACT

Irfanoglu, Zeynep B. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Three Essays on the
Interaction between Global Trade and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Agreements. Major
Professors: Thomas W. Hertel and Juan P. Sesmero.

The role of trade sanctions in enforcing greenhouse gas mitigation agreements is the
fundamental theme of the three essays comprising this dissertation. All three essays
employ a multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium model, GTAP-AEZGHG, documented in Golub et al. (2009) to investigate how the United States can use
trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism in a global greenhouse gas (GHG)
mitigation agreement. The focus is placed on inducing China to comply with the global
agreement.
The first essay contributes to the body of knowledge on global GHG emissions
mitigation agreements by investigating the range of emission taxes that can be enforced
successfully through punitive tariffs (used by the U.S. against China). The results suggest
that the ability of punitive tariffs to enforce a multilateral environmental agreement may
be substantial. However, the set of credible and effective threats shrinks as the emission
tax increases from 0 to $38/TCE, and becomes null afterwards. Therefore, there is a
trade-off between the targeted abatement level and the viability of punitive tariffs as an
enforcement mechanism. The results are robust to meaningful changes in Armington
elasticities.

xiii
The second essay investigates the economic and environmental performance of
emission-based Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) in agricultural sectors. The analysis
shows that emission-based BTAs are helpful in controlling emissions leakage but not on
the loss of competitiveness in agricultural sectors. It is also observed that the results
about the assessment of impacts of BTAs on emissions leakage are quite sensitive to the
method used to measure the emission content of products. Ignoring indirect emissions in
a production chain leads to underestimation of emission content of products which as a
result leads to underestimation of effectiveness of BTAs.
The final essay brings the understanding having been developed in Essays 1 and 2
together and investigates the viability of emission-based BTAs as an enforcement
mechanism used by the U.S. against China in global GHG mitigation agreements. It is
found that as long as global emission tax does not exceed $21.50/TCE threshold, and
there is no legal constraints imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) it is
possible for the U.S. to find a viable BTA level to induce China to take the same
abatement measures. However, when GATT is followed and damage of pollution is not
taken into account, the set of viable BTA threats is empty. Comparison of this result with
the findings of the first essay of this dissertation suggests that, by providing a wider range
of viable emission tax, punitive tariffs provide more stability to a global GHG mitigation
agreement than emission-based BTAs. It is also observed that the maximum enforceable
emissions tax (MET) increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. For
instance, increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases MET by $8
(from $21.50/TCE to $30/TCE).

1

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

According to Nordhaus (1991) global warming is a direct result of human
activities. Cooperation between nations is required to fight the problem. The Kyoto
Protocol (1997) was the first attempt to reach this cooperation between countries and start
the reduction in the GHG emissions. The Kyoto protocol obligated the developed
countries (Annex I countries) to start controlling their GHG emissions in 2008 and
achieve targeted abatement by 2012. For the developing countries (non-Annex I
countries), on the other hand, the protocol did not set any obligations but let them abate
their emissions voluntarily.
The major accomplishment of the Kyoto Protocol was to increase awareness to
the global warming problem. Although, the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol expired in 2012 without achieving a global consensus between countries (only
83 out of out of 192 parties ratified the protocol), there are invaluable lessons we can take
from this first attempt. For instance, as Barrett (2003) posited, the lack of enforcement
mechanism within the Kyoto protocol as a central reason of its ineffectiveness. The initial
focus of the protocol was to determine which countries would abate and what the size of
the emission reductions would be. However, the question of how those goals would be
reached was not addressed in the initial version of the protocol. An answer to that
question has been suggested by including reward type of enforcement
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mechanisms in later versions of the protocol. However, Barrett (2003) states that lack of
enforcement mechanism in the initial version affected overall success of the protocol.
If Barrett’s advice is taken, a new global GHG mitigation agreement should
definitely include some kind of enforcement mechanism in its structure. Moreover, to
achieve global emissions reductions sufficient to stabilize CO2 concentration this new
agreement should be signed and ratified by China and the United States, the two largest
emitters of global human related GHG emissions (Leggett, 2011) responsible for almost
40% of the global GHG emissions (21% by China and 19% by the U.S.). This fact makes
these two nations the most important players of this public-good type climate change
game. Fortunately, unlike the standard public good game in which the only link between
the players is provision of the public good and hence the optimal strategy of that game is
always to free ride, in the climate change game the two players/nations, i.e., China and
the U.S., are linked to each other not only through the Earth’s atmosphere they live in but
also through the international trade markets they participate. This second link between
the two players makes international trade barriers such as punitive tariffs and Border Tax
Adjustment (BTA) perfect candidates for enforcement mechanisms.
All three essays in this dissertation employ a multi-sector, multi-region
computable general equilibrium model, GTAP-AEZ-GHG, documented in Golub et al.
(2009). The results reported in this dissertation are obtained using the GEMPACK
economic modeling software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). The main assumption made
in this dissertation is that at the beginning of the abatement game, the U.S. and rest of the
World (ROW) are voluntarily controlling their emissions while China is free riding. In
other words, there is no initially exogenous inducement on the U.S. or ROW. Under such
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assumption, the main questions answered in this dissertation are that: 1) under what
conditions does the U.S. have incentives to threaten China with trade barriers to induce
China to comply with the agreement? 2) Under what conditions does China have
incentives to comply with the agreement instead of free-riding and receiving trade
barriers from the U.S.?
Chapter 2 answers these questions when punitive tariffs are the trade barriers the
U.S. considers to use against China’s free-ride. The results show that as long as global
emission price does not exceed $38 per tons of carbon (C )equivalent (TCE) threshold it
is always possible for the U.S. to find some punitive tariff level at which 1) the U.S. is
willing to implement the trade barrier to Chinese imports to induce China to join the U.S.
and the rest of the World in GHG abatement (Credibility Condition), and 2) China is
willing to comply with the global GHG mitigation agreement instead of free-riding but
receiving the U.S.’s punitive tariffs (Effectiveness Condition).
Chapter 2 also clarifies some confusion in the literature regarding terminology.
The first issue is related to the “credibility” of an inducement (or threat) for which
changes in the U.S. welfare can be used to provide an answer. The second issue, on the
other hand, is about the “effectiveness” of an inducement/threat for which welfare
changes of China can be used to provide an answer.
Changing focus, Chapter 3, explores effects of emission-based Border Tax
Adjustments (BTAs) on emission leakage, competitiveness loss and regional and global
welfare changes in agricultural sectors. The role of BTAs in the context of agriculture has
received less attention in the literature compared with that in manufacturing sectors. It is
mainly because of the existing studies considering only CO2 emissions but ignoring the
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other greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. While agriculture plays a
small role in CO2 combustion emissions, it is much more important in the context of the
hitherto under-emphasized, non-CO2 emissions, including methane and nitrous oxide.
BTAs are tariffs on emissions embodied in imports coming from countries which
are not controlling their emissions. Therefore, it is very important how accurate emissions
embodied in imports are calculated. For that purpose, Chapter 3 tests the sensitivity of the
BTA impacts to alternative methods for calculating the emission embodied in a product.
The results show that BTAs have some impact on controlling emission leakage but not on
recovering competitiveness losses in agricultural sectors. It is also found that these results
are sensitive to method chosen to calculate the emissions embodied in imports. Ignoring
indirect emissions leads to underestimating emission content of products and results in
smaller impact of emission-based BTAs on emission leakage in agricultural and other
sectors in non-abating regions.
Finally, Chapter 4 brings the methods developed in Chapters 2 and 3 together and
investigates how the U.S. can use emission-based BTAs as an enforcement mechanism in
a GHG mitigation agreement to induce China to comply with a global agreement. The
results show that as long as global emission price does not exceed a threshold of $21.50
per tons of carbon equivalent (TCE), it is always possible for the U.S. to find some BTA
level at which, 1) the U.S. is willing to implement the BTA on Chinese imports, and 2)
China is willing to comply with the global GHG mitigation agreement instead of freeriding and receiving the U.S.’s BTA. It is also observed that the maximum enforceable
emissions tax (MET) increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. For
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instance, $5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases
MET by $8 (from $21.50/TCE to $30/TCE).
As enforcement mechanisms, the performance of punitive tariffs and BTAs are
compared also in Chapter 4. The comparison results show that when marginal damage
from pollution is $10/TCE, punitive tariffs provide larger range of emissions taxes
($60/TCE) than BTAs ($40/TCE). Therefore, punitive tariffs are more stable deterrents
for China’s free-riding used by the U.S. in a global GHG mitigation agreement. This is an
interesting result considering that it is still an actively debated issue whether punitive
tariffs can be used as an enforcement mechanism as some consider punitive tariffs to be
conflicting with the current WTO regulations.
Regarding the methodologies of Chapters 2 and 4, unlike Chapter 2, benefits of
abatement are taken into account in Chapter 4. Because in Chapter 4, it is found that if a
strict implementation of GATT’s rules and regulations is followed and damage of
pollution is ignored, the set of viable BTA threats is empty. To be able to find a nonempty set of viable BTA threats benefits of abatement needs to be taken into account.
However, the estimates of marginal damage of pollution in the literature vary widely
(Nordhaus, 2011). Therefore, a non-zero lower bound of the maximum enforcement
emission tax in BTA case is investigated for three cases: when marginal damage of
pollution equals $5/TCE, $10/TCE or $15/TCE. In Chapter 2, on the other hand,
conceptually there is no equality condition between the change in the power of tariff rate
and the level of emission tax. Therefore, Chapter 2 ignores the damage of pollution and
provides only a lower bound for the effectiveness condition, an upper bound of the
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credibility conditions, and thus a lower bound of the maximum enforcement emissions
tax.
This dissertation incorporates insights from game theory to the investigation of
the interaction between global trade and GHG mitigation agreements which guarantees
consistency of policy decisions with incentive compatibility conditions under strategic
behavior. If the set of credible and effective threats is empty, trade sanctions can be ruled
out an enforcement mechanism regardless of legal or political viability. Ignoring strategic
behavior (through game theory) may fail to identify these limitations of trade sanctions.
For example an analysis that ignores strategic behavior may find that a threat of trade
sanctions could induce cooperation when such threat is not credible. This would tend to
overestimate the power of trade sanctions as enforcement mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 2. CAN UNITED STATES CONVINCE CHINA TO COMPLY WITH A
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION AGREEMENT BY USING
PUNITIVE TARIFFS: A CASE STUDY

2.1

Introduction

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expired in 2012 without
achieving its goal of limiting overall greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries
over 2008 – 2012 period. This is not surprising considering the fact that the U.S. and
China, the two largest contributors to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Leggett,
2011; CAIT 2011) are yet to take action aimed at curbing their GHG emissions.
Incentives of countries to sign and comply with the Kyoto protocol are diminished by two
central features of the agreement: 1) it exempts the non-Annex I countries1, including
China; and, 2) it lacks an enforcement mechanism that would be effective in guaranteeing
compliance (Owen and Hanley, 2004).
Barrett (2003) posited the lack of enforcement mechanism within the Kyoto
protocol as a central reason of its ineffectiveness. Since the Earth’s atmosphere is a
global public good and GHG emissions cause trans-boundary externalities, the Kyoto
protocol (or any other international environmental agreement designed to curb GHG
emissions) has the structure of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma: while the social
optimum is achieved when all countries cooperate, all of them have individual

1

Non-Annex I countries are mostly developing countries that have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
but have no binding emission reduction targets.
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incentives not to do so. If there is no enforcement mechanism that allows complying
countries to punish free-riders (or incentivizing them to comply) then no cooperation can
be sustained. In this essay, it is hypothesized that trade sanctions in the form of punitive
tariffs (used by the U.S. against China) may constitute a viable enforcement mechanism
to sustain compliance within a range of global carbon taxes in the context of agreements
to curb global GHG emissions.
Enforcement mechanisms may consist of rewards to compliers such as technology
transfer and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), or punishment to non-compliers
such as trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs or border tax adjustments (BTAs).
This study focuses on the punishment option and investigates empirically the viability of
punitive tariffs in global GHG emissions mitigation agreements. While it is still an
actively debated issue (Barrett, 2003; Perez, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006; Perez, 2007) there are
some solid arguments in favor of the consistency of trade sanctions with regulations from
the World Trade Organization (WTO). As noted by Stiglitz (2006) failing to curb
emissions works in fact as a subsidy in non-signatory countries which gives signatory
countries the right to prohibit or impose tariffs on the imports from non-signatory
countries. Moreover, while retaliatory tariffs are not allowed under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the WTO, Article XX of the GATT allows
parties to take actions “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”
Trade sanctions have been used in the past as an enforcement mechanism in
environmental agreements. For instance, trade sanctions have been successfully used as
an enforcement mechanism to control Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS). Countries
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signed the Montreal Protocol (UNEP, 1987) which employed trade restrictions and
threats to ban trade in ODS and ODS-containing products with non-parties. Although the
two problems, i.e. control of the ODSs and the GHG mitigation, have fundamental differences2 this study posits that trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs may constitute a
viable enforcement mechanism to sustain compliance in a global GHG mitigation
agreement.
Punitive tariffs are a viable enforcement tool as long as they satisfy two
conditions: credibility and effectiveness. A threat is credible if and only if the punisher is
better off applying the punishment to the non-complying party. On the other hand, a
threat is effective if and only if the punished country is better off complying rather than
free riding and receiving the punishment. Fulfillment of the two conditions depends on
the payoffs obtained in each scenario. Credibility imposes a condition on the payoff for
the punisher while effectiveness constraints the payoff for the punished country. While a
threat may be credible it may not be effective and vice versa.
A few studies have shown theoretically that trade sanctions can work as an
enforcement mechanism in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Barrett (1997)
builds a simple static partial equilibrium model to show that trade sanctions, in particular
banning trade of certain commodities between signatories and non-signatories, can
constitute credible threats to convince free-riders to comply with an MEA. Barrett takes
the Montreal Protocol (1987) as an example in which substances that deplete ozone layer

2

Barrett (2007) lists the differences between the two problems. One difference is that in depletion of the
ozone layer problem, everyone on Earth is affected in the same way, i.e., they all become worse off. In the
global warming problem, on the other hand, different regions are affected by the problem in different ways,
at least in the short term. For instance, while some regions become worse off because of sea level rise,
some regions become better off because of the improved agricultural productivity in warmer climate.
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are taken under control by banning trade of certain products between signatories and nonsignatories. Provision of the public good is then linked to international trade. Similarly,
Finus (2001) notes that this link can contribute to an agreement in three respects: (1)
leading to a more symmetric distribution of gains from cooperation; (2) increasing the
number of options to be used as enforcement mechanisms; (3) converting a public good
agreement into a club good agreement by using trade sanctions to exclude non signatories
from the benefits of international trade. Naghavi (2010) builds a theoretical partial
equilibrium model in which he demonstrates that trade sanctions can, credibly and
effectively, enforce a MEA. These studies did not however analyze the empirical viability
of trade sanctions.
Among the empirical studies investigating the viability of punitive tariffs as an
enforcement mechanism in MEAs (Dröge and Kemfert, 2005; Lessmann et al., 2009), the
common tendency is to consider a specific scenario, such as Kyoto Protocol, and to check
the credibility and or effectiveness of it. For example, Dröge and Kemfert (2005)
investigate the effectiveness of 30% tariff on the U.S. products imported by the Annex I
countries in convincing the U.S. to return to the Kyoto Protocol. For that purpose Dröge
and Kemfert use the WIAGEM Model (Kemfert, 2002a; Kemfert, 2002b) which is an
integrated assessment model. It is built by bringing a general equilibrium model of the
global economics, a climate model and an ecological impact model together. Change in
terms of trade is used as welfare measure. Their results show that 30% import tariff is not
effective enough to convince the US to return to the Kyoto Protocol.
Lessmann et al. (2009), on the other hand, conducts a numerical (though not
empirically calibrated) assessment of the viability of import tariffs as an enforcement
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mechanism in a MEA using an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM). The authors
identify tariff rates that would credibly and effectively enforce a MEA implementing a
set of “optimal”, i.e. Nash equilibrium, abatement efforts. The optimal abatement efforts
are determined based on actual benefits, i.e. prevented output losses, derived from them.
However calculating “optimal” abatement levels in reality is a daunting task, not to
mention that implementation of such optimal strategies may be politically infeasible. An
empirically informative strategy to assess the viability of trade sanctions as enforcement
mechanisms may be to investigate the range of abatement efforts that the sanctions could
support and the sensitivity of that range to economic parameters. Yet there is a dearth of
information on the link between emission taxes and the viability of trade sanctions to
enforce them. Filling this gap would help to answer many empirically relevant questions.
For example, is there a credible and effective tariff threat for all plausible values of
emission taxes? Is this tariff, if one exists, unique? Are increases in emission tax
associated with a larger or smaller range of credible and effective tariffs? In other words,
can threats of trade sanctions effectively enforce more stringent climate policies? The
latter question sheds light into potential tradeoffs between efficiency and stability. The
study presented herein aims to answer these questions.
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by investigating quantitatively
the range of emission taxes that can be successfully enforced through punitive tariffs
(used by the U.S. against China) in the context of global GHG mitigation agreements,
and the robustness of this tool to changes in key structural parameters in the economy, i.e.
preference parameters. Payoffs obtained by the punishing and the punished countries are
determined by direct market effects of tariffs and by feedbacks from displacement of the
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equilibrium in interrelated markets. Quantifying the latter requires a general equilibrium
approach to the problem. This paper uses a global static computable general equilibrium
GTAP-AEZ-GHG model (Golub et al., 2009; Hertel et al., 2009), to measure changes in
payoffs associated with trade sanctions. Based on these payoffs the change in power of
import tariff is computed at and below which the punishing region is better off applying
the punishment. This is taken to be the threshold for the credibility condition. Then, this
rate is compared with the threshold for the effectiveness condition; i.e. the minimum
change in power of import tariff that can convince the punished region to comply with
the global abatement agreement. In this model, the World economy is divided into three
regions: the U.S., China, and the rest of the World (ROW). It is assumed that the U.S.
will join the agreement as long as an enforcement mechanism is in place. Then, the
viability of punitive tariffs as a mechanism through which the U.S. attempts to induce
China to comply with a global emission tax policy is investigated.
To analyze the link between emission taxes and the viability of trade sanctions as
an enforcement mechanism a three-stage game is designed with the following structure.
While an abatement policy is set by the U.S. and the rest of the world (ROW), China
initially does not implement any GHG emission reductions. The U.S. threatens China
with punitive tariffs on all Chinese products to induce China to set the same abatement
policy. In this study, punitive tariffs are considered as a deterrent to free-riding. Therefore,
if they are viable (i.e., credible and effective), there will be no need to use them. If
punitive tariffs are viable then it is expected that a global environmental agreement will
be signed and complied with by all three regions: the U.S., China, and ROW.
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The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The next section introduces
research methodology. It contains a brief description of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model, and
a formal representation of the game. The results of my simulations are presented in
Section 2.3. The sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 2.4 with a conclusion in the
final section, Section 2.5.

2.2
2.2.1

Methodology

The GTAP-AEZ-GHG Model

The model represents a modified version of the standard GTAP model (Hertel,
1997). In the standard GTAP model there is a regional household that collects all factor
income and taxes in the economy. Regional household behavior is governed by an
aggregate utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form and it is specified over three sources
of final demand: (i) composite private consumption, (ii) composite government
consumption, and (iii) savings. Private household derives its utility from the consumption
of domestic and imported goods and services based on a non-homothetic Constant
Difference of Elasticity (CDE) functional form. Due to the non-homothetic nature of
private household demand, elasticity of expenditure with respect to utility is not constant
which is taken into account by the regional household optimization. The second final
demand source is the government demand which is specified via Cobb-Douglas
functional form. This assumption is reflected in the homothetic preferences and constant
budget shares of government consumption of domestic and imported commodities.
Savings is the third final demand in regional household’s utility. In the multi-region
GTAP model there is a global sector called Global Bank which is assumed as a mediatory
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between global savings and regional investment. One of the ways to think about the
Global Bank is that it collects savings from all regions to finance regional investment. Or
it can be thought of as purchasing capital goods and then sells them to regional
households to meet their demand for savings.
Producers in the GTAP model are assumed to maximize profits subject to
constant returns to scale technologies in a perfectly competitive market. Production is
modeled using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nested function. In the top
level, the output is produced as a combination of value added and intermediate demand
according to Leontief technology. In the second level, value added is split into primary
factors such as land, skilled and unskilled labor, capital and natural resources according
to CES technology. The GTAP model assumes separability in production. The firms are
assumed to first choose their optimal mix of primary factors, and then determine the
optimal mix of value-added and intermediate inputs. Producers use intermediate inputs
which can be domestically produced or imported, again based on CES functional form.
The sourcing of imported intermediate inputs is combined by a CES nest. The
separability assumption applies here, as well. Firms are assumed to decide first on the
sourcing of their inputs which determines the composite import price. Then, based on the
resulting composite import price, firms choose the optimal mix of imported to domestic
goods.
The domestic region trades with the aggregated “rest of the world” for
intermediate goods demanded by producers and for final consumption goods demanded
by private household and government. In the GTAP model, the Armington approach to
trade is employed so that domestic products and imported products coming from different
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regions are imperfect substitutes. The GTAP model is a real model in the sense that all
prices are relative to a numeraire.
The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model is developed in Golub et al. (2009) by applying the
following modifications to the standard GTAP model.
•

Production and consumption structure of the model are modified to allow capitalenergy and inter-fuel substitution (Burniaux and Truong, 2002).

•

GHG emissions data including the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel
combustion (Lee, 2007) and non-carbon dioxide (non-CO2) emissions (methane,
nitrous oxide and F-gases) documented in Rose and Lee (2009) are introduced into
the model.

•

Within each of 24 sectors of the model, GHG emissions are tied to specific drivers
such as primary factors, intermediate inputs, and output.

•

Land in each region is represented as a heterogeneous endowment divided up to 18
agro-ecological zones (AEZs) (Lee et al. 2009). Each AEZ differs in terms of its
suitability for production of crops, forestry and livestock.

•

The model incorporates mitigation cost curves for different sectors and regions based
on data from the USEPA (USEPA, 2006) by calibrating relevant parameters in the
GTAP-AEZ-GHG model to these curves.

•

The forestry component of the model is calibrated to the results of the state of the art
partial equilibrium global forestry model documented in Sohngen and Mendelson
(2007).

•

Forest extensification and intensification decisions are modeled separately better to
isolate competition for land between agriculture and timber products.
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The policy scenario considered in this study is a tax on emissions of greenhouse
gases (CO2 and non-CO2) and a forest carbon sequestration incentive. An emissions tax is
imposed on intermediate and primary input and output related emissions in agricultural
and industrial sectors and emissions from private consumption of fossil fuels. Other
studies on trade sanctions (Dröge and Kemfert, 2005; Lessmann et al., 2009; Naghavi,
2010) set emissions tax only on output because their models tie all emissions directly to
output. In this study, on the other hand, I employ a more refined approach and tie
emissions to specific drivers within each sector.
Separating emissions from primary and intermediate inputs from emissions from
outputs allows for more flexibility in emissions reduction. In particular, in addition to
output reduction, emission abatement can be achieved through reductions in the emission
intensity of production. The extent to which emissions abatement is achieved through
each channel in the economy, depends upon how freely production factors can move
across sectors. As production factors become less mobile, the economy is increasingly
dependent on production reductions to achieve abatement of emissions. In the model,
there are four production factors: land, labor, capital and natural resources. It is assumed
that labor and capital are perfectly mobile, land (differentiated into 18 zones) is partially
mobile and natural resources are fixed. One limitation of our model is that it does not
allow for quantification of the impacts of factor mobility assumptions on abatement
mechanisms. Without adjustment costs on labor and capital, a sensitivity analysis of
abatement results with respect to adjustment cost parameters is ruled out.
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2.2.2

Structure of the Game

I build a three-stage game to investigate the viability of punitive tariffs as an
enforcement mechanism. In other words, the game structure is used to find conditions
under which the U.S. threat against China is both credible and effective. The structure of
the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the U.S. and ROW implement a mitigation policy and
China plays a default strategy of no emissions reduction. In Stage 2, the U.S. observes
China’s free-ride and threatens it by imposing punitive tariffs on all imports from China.
In Stage 3, China observes the global emissions tax level and the punitive tariffs threat
from the U.S. and decides whether or not to comply with the emissions tax (see Figure
2.1). In this game, it is assumed that China does not retaliate against the U.S. tariffs
because retaliation tariffs are not allowed under the GATT by the WTO.
It is also assumed that there is no change in strategies of ROW while the U.S. is
inducing China to comply with the agreement. The only role assigned to ROW is to
participate in the abatement agreement. This is a reasonable assumption considering the
fact that the EU, the biggest player in the ROW is already making efforts to curb its GHG
emissions regardless of US or China’s involvement.
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Figure 2.1 The Game Tree

Welfare changes are used to measure the payoffs of the regions. The GTAP-AEZGHG model is employed to quantify welfare changes associated with different
combinations of strategies considered in the analysis. Concept of equivalent variation
(EV) is applied to measure changes in the welfare of the regions3. Thus,

is the equivalent variation of region

{

, ,
,

,

,

} when the emissions tax set by

the U.S. and ROW is , the percentage change in the power of import tariffs4 imposed by
the U.S. on Chinese imports if China free-rides is
U.S.’s threat is

= {

, !"#$%}.

[0,1], and China’s action given the

3

In the model, the regional household’s EV is equal to the difference between the expenditure required to
obtain new (post-simulation) level of utility at initial prices and initial expenditure. McDougall (2001)
documents EV calculation in the GTAP model.

4

Power of a tax, by definition, is the ratio of the price with tax over the price without tax, i.e., equal to the
tax rate plus one. Thus, if the power of tax is greater than one, the implemented rate is really a tax, and
when the power of tax is less than one, the implemented rate is a subsidy.
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2.3

Results

The simulations5 show that in every scenario and for any level of emissions tax
the equivalent variation of the U.S. is lower when China free rides than when it complies
because of changes in terms of trade. That is,
()*

,

= 0,

<

()*

,

= 0, !"#$% , ∀

Since free-riding by China always harms the U.S. for any level of emission tax, the U.S.
has always incentives to threaten China to convince it to abate. Therefore in Stage 2, it is
assumed that the U.S. threatens China with an increase in power of tariffs on imports
from China.

2.3.1

Credible Threats

A tariff threat is viable as long as it is both credible and effective. Credibility
depends on the welfare change of the punishing region. Effectiveness depends on the
welfare change of the punished region. At a given emissions tax , a change in power of
import tariffs imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is incentive compatible for
the U.S. when the cost of implementing the threat is lower than its benefits, rendering a
higher equivalent variation to the U.S. That is
()*

,

= 0,

<

()*

,

> 0,

.

To assess the credibility of a tariff threat a very stringent abatement policy is
initially considered and then it is investigated whether increasing the power of tariffs on
Chinese imports (if China free rides) makes the U.S. better off. I do this by assuming that

5

The results reported in this essay are obtained using the GEMPACK economic modeling software
(Harrison and Pearson, 1996).
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the global emissions tax is $35 per ton of carbon equivalent (TCE)6 and calculating EV
for the U.S. at 1% increments in the power of import tariffs. Figure 2.2 shows how the
U.S.’ EV changes with the power of tariffs imposed on Chinese imports.

EV of the U.S. (USD million)
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Change in power of tariff (%)

Figure 2.2 USA Equivalent Variation (USD million) under $35/TCE Emissions Tax

The welfare change of the U.S. illustrated in Figure 2.2 follows an expected
pattern: welfare loss first decreases and then increases as the power of tariff increases.
Increasing the power of tariff on Chinese products entails costs and benefits for the U.S.
On one hand, increasing the power of tariff improves terms of trade for the U.S., i.e., it
increases the competitiveness of the U.S. production relative to that of China7. On the
other hand, increasing the power of tariff increases the cost of consumption goods for U.S.

6

To convert price per ton of CO2 to price per ton C, multiply by the ratio of molecular weights,
44/12=3.67, i.e., $1/TCO2eq = $3.67/TCE.

7

Import tariffs decreases demand for imports and hence increases demand for domestic products which
leads to decrease in exports. Lower exports increases export price of import tariff implementing country
which increases the terms of trade of that country. By definition, the terms of trade is the ratio of export
prices to import prices increases.
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consumers. Up to a critical point8 which is 5% in this case, the benefits of increasing the
tariff outweigh the costs. Although the cost effective increase in the power of tariff for
the U.S. is 5% at $35/TCE any increase in power of tariff above 10% reduces the U.S.
welfare to a level even lower than in the scenario without the tariff (green line in Figure
2.2)9. In such a case, it is more beneficial for the U.S. to let China free ride. Figure 2.2
suggests that, with an emission tax of $35/TCE, the change in power of tariff is credible
as long as it does not exceed 10%.
()*
()*

and

()*

= 35,

= 35,

= 35,

= 0,

<

= 0,

>

= 0,

()*
()*

= −756

= 35,

= 35,

≤ 10,

> 10,

,

5 " $$ (green line in Figure 2.2)

For instance, at 11% change in power of tariffs, the total welfare loss in the U.S. exceeds
the welfare loss under China non-compliance and no trade sanctions, rendering the threat
non-credible.

2.3.2

Effective Threats

A tariff imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is effective if China
achieves a higher EV when complying with the global GHG mitigation agreement than
free riding and receiving the punishment from the U.S. That is
678

,

= 0, !"#$% >

678

,

> 0,

8

In the literature this critical point in the welfare change of the import tariff country is called optimal tariff.
However, in this context it should be called cost effective tariff because of the analysis including only cost
of abatement and ignoring benefits from it.
9

See Table A1 for the EV of the U.S. under different level of emissions taxes when China free rides but the
U.S. does not punish China for its free-ride.
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,

678

= 0, !"#$% = −7953 UDS million (green line in Figure 2.3)10

The effectiveness of a tariff threat is verified by initially assuming that the global
emissions tax is $35/TCE and varying the power of import tariff in 1% increments.
Figure 2.3 illustrates China’s EV for a range of tariff threats imposed by the U.S. on the
entire Chinese imports. As the U.S. increases the punishment level China’s EV decreases.
However, up to 9% increase in power of tariffs, China’s welfare loss due to tariff
punishment does not exceed the welfare loss associated with abatement.
= 35,

678

= 9,

>

= 35,

678

= 0, !"#$%

−8,021 USD million > −7,953 USD million

In other words, under the assumption that both ROW and the U.S. are taxing emissions in
all sectors and provide forest carbon sequestration incentives at emission price $35/TCE,
9% or more increase in power of import tariffs can convince China to comply with the
mitigation policy. Therefore, 9% is the minimum change in power of tariff that is
effective at the given emission tax.
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Figure 2.3 China’s Equivalent Variation (USD million) under $35/TCE Emissions Tax
10

See Table A2 for the EV of China under different level of emissions taxes when China complies with the
agreement and implement the corresponding emissions tax on its GHG emissions.
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2.3.3

Viable Threats

When results illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are brought together, I find that
under an emission tax of $35/TCE, any change in power of import tariff between 9% and
10% are both credible and effective. I then repeat this analysis for a range of emissions
taxes. Figure 2.4 displays combinations of emissions taxes and changes in power of tariff
for which a tariff threat is both credible and effective. The credibility curve (the blue line
in Figure 2.4) represents the maximum change in power of tariff that the U.S. is willing
to implement to convince China at a given emission tax. The combinations of tax and
tariffs below that line achieve credibility; i.e. the U.S. is better off implementing the
punitive tariff than not implementing it when China is free riding. The effectiveness
curve (the red curve in Figure 2.4) represents the minimum change in power of tariff that
can convince China to comply at a given emission tax. Combinations above the red line
achieve effectiveness; i.e., China is better off complying and avoiding the punitive tariff
than free riding and being punished. The effectiveness curve is convex and monotonically
increasing. This is an expected result considering the fact that as the environmental policy
becomes more stringent it becomes more costly for China to abate and hence the
minimum change in power of tariff that can induce China to abate increases.
The area below the blue line and above the red line constitutes the set of emission
tax and change in power of tariff combinations that achieve both credibility and
effectiveness simultaneously. The blue line intersects the red line at the point where
emission tax is $38/TCE meaning that changes in power of the tariff can credibly and
effectively support emission taxes less than or equal to $38/TCE. The set of credible and
effective threats shrinks as the emission tax increases from 0 to $38/TCE, and becomes
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null afterwards. Therefore the results suggest a trade-off between abatement level
targeted and self-enforcement of an international environmental agreement. As the
emission price increases, an increasingly smaller set of power of tariffs achieve both
credibility and effectiveness. On a positive note, these results suggest that though the
ability of punitive tariffs to successfully enforce a MEA is limited, it is still substantial;

Change in Power of Tariff (%)

an emission tax of $38/TCE is far from being trivial.
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Figure 2.4 Credible and Effective Changes in Power of Import Tariffs across Emissions
Taxes

Under global abatement with a $38/TCE emissions tax (the most stringent policy
for which trade sanctions are still a viable enforcement mechanism), the U.S.’s and
China’s welfare changes are -291 USD million and -8,794 USD million,11 respectively
(see Table 2.1). If China rejects abatement and chooses to free ride and the U.S. does not
impose a sanction, China’s welfare increases by 761 USD million but the U.S.’s welfare
is reduced by 1,234 USD million. To convince China to implement abatement, the U.S.

11

Welfare changes are negative because benefits from pollution abatement are not considered. As
discussed earlier, I do not explicitly consider the optimality of a given emission tax.
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would have to impose a 10% increase in the power of tariff on all China’s tradable goods.
Under the trade sanction, the U.S. welfare change becomes -1,224 USD million which is
slightly smaller welfare loss than in the case when Chine free-rides with no punishment.
However, China’s welfare change becomes -8,809 USD million which is slightly bigger
welfare loss than in the case when China abates. Therefore, while a 10% increase in
import tariff makes a free-riding China worse off than complying with abatement
(making it an effective threat), its cost to U.S. is not as high as letting China free-ride
(making it a credible threat).

Table 2.1 Welfare Changes of the U.S. and China for Different Scenarios under $38/TCE
Emissions Tax (USD million)
Global
China free-rides
China free-rides and USA
Abatement but USA does not punish
increases power of tariff by 10%
USA
CHN

-291
-8,794

-1,234
761

-1,224
-8,809

Figure 2.5 illustrates the EV of the U.S. under varying emissions tax and change
in power of tariffs. This figure reveals that the U.S.’s welfare increases with initial
increases in power of tariffs for a given emission tax. After a certain point, however,
additional increase in the power of tariff starts to reduce the U.S.’s EV. Moreover,
increases in the level of the emission tax decreases the EV at an increasing rate.
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2.4

Sensitivity Analysis

The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model employs Armington specification of international
trade (Armington, 1969) which assumes that commodities produced in different regions
are imperfect substitutes. Figure 2.5 is consistent with the market power effect of tariffs
noted by Lessmann et al. (2009). Under the assumption that commodities are
differentiated according to their origins, each region obtains some market power12.
Implementation of tariffs by coalition members increases their market power and hence
their terms of trade. This positive terms-of-trade effect increases the welfare of the region
that imposes the tariff which gives incentives not only to the coalition member regions to
use tariffs against free-riders but also to the free-riders to comply with the MEA. When
the U.S. increases its tariff on Chinese imports the terms-of-trade of the U.S. are
12

Under the Armington assumption, while there is no domestic production of imported varieties there is
demand for all varieties. Thus, each region has some market power for their own variety.
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improved which leads to an increase in welfare in the U.S. However, just like in
monopoly pricing, as the change in power of import tariff exceeds a threshold value the
benefits of a tariff to the U.S. start to vanish13.
The econometric estimates of the Armington elasticities provided in Hertel et al.
(2007) are used in this modeling work. In this section, I explore how the thresholds of
change in power of import tariffs and emissions tax depend on the Armington elasticities
when the values of the parameter are systematically increased and decreased by two
standard deviations to higher and lower values. We find that the qualitative pattern of the
thresholds of punitive tariffs and emission taxes are reasonably robust to alternative
values of the Armington elasticities (see Table 2.2)14.

Table 2.2 Thresholds of Power of Import Tariff and Emissions Tax under Varying
Armington Elasticities
Trade elasticities
Change in power of tariff (%)
Emissions tax ($/TCE)
Original
10
38
High
9.3
34
Low
10.7
40

Figure 2.6 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations estimated by
Hertel et al. (2007). Under high Armington elasticities, the credibility and effectiveness
thresholds intersect at a 9.3% change in power of the tariff and a tax of $34/TCE (see
Table 2.2). As revealed by Figure 2.6, the increase in Armington elasticities shrinks the
13

See Zhang (2006) for details about the relationship between the Armington assumption and terms-oftrade effects of a tariff.
14

To detect difference in change in power of tariffs at low and high Armington elasticities, 0.1% step is
used.
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size of the set of credible and effective threats. As the Armington elasticities increase,
commodities with different origins become more substitutable and hence the market
power effect of tariffs vanishes. In such case, a change in power of tariff by 9.3%
imposed by the U.S. on Chinese imports is the limit for a punitive tariff to stay both
credible and effective.
Conversely, when the Armington elasticities are low, tariff threats to China are
both credible and effective as long as the change in power of tariff does not increase by
more than 10.7% and the emissions tax is not higher than $40/TCE (see Table 2.2). As
the commodities from different origins become less substitutable, captured by a reduction
in Armington elasticities, impact of tariffs on terms of trade increases and hence the set of
both credible and effective tariff threats expands from 10% to 10.7% change in power of
import tariff and from $38/TCE to $40/TCE in emissions tax.
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Figure 2.6 Change in Credibility and Effectiveness Conditions under Different
Armington Elasticities
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2.5

Conclusions

As the two largest GHG emitters, the U.S. and China are two major players in the
game of GHG mitigation. Because the game has the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma,
due to absence of a viable enforcement mechanism both countries have, so far, refused to
cooperate. In this study, under the assumption that the U.S. abates its emissions along
with the rest of the world but China, it is investigated under what conditions trade
sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs become a viable tool to deter China from freeriding, and have China agree to take the same abatement measures with the rest of the
world.
For threat of trade sanctions to become a viable enforcement mechanism punitive
tariffs have to achieve two conditions defined in this study: credibility and effectiveness.
Unlike other studies, we do not presume to calculate an optimal emission tax but rather
we employ a computable general equilibrium model to estimate empirically the range of
emission taxes that can be successfully enforced through trade sanctions.
In particular we found that the U.S. has always, i.e., under all emission tax levels,
incentives to use trade sanctions as enforcement mechanism to convince China to comply
with the global mitigation agreement. It is also found that in a scenario where China is
refusing to implement an emissions tax there is a set of emission taxes and changes in
import tariffs for which trade sanctions constitute a viable enforcement mechanism for
the environmental agreement. The viability of trade sanctions as an enforcement
mechanism vanishes at high levels of emission taxes which suggests a potential trade-off
between abatement levels targeted and self-enforcement of an international
environmental agreement.
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Our sensitivity analyses with respect to Armington elasticities show that the set of
emission taxes that can be successfully supported through trade sanctions is reasonably
robust to alternative values of the Armington elasticities. Therefore, in general, this study
supports the hypothesis that trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariff could be used as
an enforcement mechanism to achieve a global GHG mitigation agreement.
Current CO2 price in the EU market is around €7 which makes carbon (C) price
around $35/TCE under an exchange rate of 1.32 $/€. This means the de-facto current
emissions tax in Europe is already very close to $38/TCE, i.e., the maximum enforceable
emissions tax (MET) under punitive tariff mechanism. However, it should be noted that
since benefits of abatement are not included in the analysis, this study measures the
bounds of credibility and effectiveness conditions. This essay provides a lower bound for
the effectiveness condition, an upper bound of the credibility conditions, and thus a lower
bound of the maximum enforcement emissions tax.
It should be noted that the results are not likely to be robust with respect to
changes in the role of each region in the abatement game. The set of emissions taxes and
changes in power of tariff for which a tariff threat is both credible and effective is
expected to be different when the U.S. threatens China than when China threatens the
U.S. We expect the number of such combinations to be fewer when China imposes
punitive tariffs on imports from the U.S. for China to induce the U.S. for abatement.
Since, the value of exports from China to the U.S. is greater than the value of exports
from the U.S. to China, the threat power of the U.S. against China through international
trade is greater than that of China against the U.S. Therefore, we expect China to have
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fewer punitive import tariffs options to induce the U.S. to comply with the abatement
agreement.
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CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF EMISSION-BASED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS ON
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND COMPETITIVENESS IN AGRICULTURAL
SECTORS

3.1

Introduction

Given the likely absence of a “top-down” global agreement after the 2012 expiry
of the Kyoto Protocol, many countries (or groups of countries) may only be prepared to
introduce a price on carbon emissions if they can maintain the competitiveness of their
domestic sectors and prevent leakage effects associated with the expansion of
unregulated sectors in other countries. One means of achieving these is through emissionbased border tax adjustments (BTAs) which are tariffs on emissions embodied in imports
coming from countries which are not controlling their emissions.
While BTAs may be an attractive option for countries wishing to pursue unilateral
mitigation policies, there are some significant challenges that would need to be overcome
before BTAs could be implemented. One major difficulty is how to measure the
emissions that are embodied in imports. In this chapter I investigate the economic and
environmental performance of emissions-based Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) and
examine sensitivity of these economic and environmental results to alternative methods
to calculate emission content of imports.
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Recent studies have investigated the effects of BTAs on emissions leakage,
welfare and competitiveness under different climate change policy scenarios
(Burniaux et al., 2010; Winchester, 2011; Hubler, 2011; Monjon and Quirion, 2011;
Weitzel and Peterson, 2011; Seymore et al., 2011; and Zhou et al., 2011; Bohringer et
al., 2012; Foure et al., 2013). Branger and Quirion (2013) provide a detailed literature
review on papers about impacts of BTAs on emission leakage and competitiveness.
Most of these studies have focused on CO2 combustion emissions from manufacturing
sectors. The overall conclusion from the literature is that effectiveness of BTAs is
quite heterogeneous. The size of the BTA-implementing countries, the number of
countries in a coalition, suppliers’ response to a BTA, and the method of
implementation are listed as some of the determinants of the effectiveness of BTAs.
The observed heterogeneity suggests that additional studies are required to assess the
effectiveness of BTAs in the context of other sectors and other types of GHG
emissions.
Bohringer et al. (2012) compare twelve computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models used in the literature to assess impacts of BTAs on emissions leakage and
competitiveness. The authors harmonize the assumptions of the twelve models and
use a common database, i.e., GTAP Version 7.1 database. The climate policy
Bohringer et al. stucy is a collective 20% emission reduction from its historic
emisison level in 2004 (and this collective target is equally distributed across all
members of Annex I). In that study, emission-based BTAs are implemeted by Annex
I (including te U.S. but exluding Russia) only on the emisison intensive and tradeexposed (EITE) sectors. The emission content of a product is measured by
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considering direct emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and indirect
emissions associated with the generation of electricity. Bohringer et al. find that when
emission-based BTAs are not implemented leakage rates range between 5% and 19%
with a mean value across all models of 12% in EITE sectors. When BTAs are
implemented by Annex I to the EITE goods from non-coalition regions, emission
leakge rates range between 2% and 12% with a mean value of 8%.
The role of BTAs in the context of agriculture has received less attention
compared with that in manufacturing sectors. While agriculture plays a small role in
CO2 combustion emissions, it is much more important in the context of the hitherto
under-emphasized, non-CO2 emissions, including methane and nitrous oxide. There is
growing awareness in the literature about how much contribution to global GHG
mitigation can be made by livestock and crop sectors (Steinfeld et al., 2006; Steinfeld
and Wassenaar, 2007; Smith et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2012; Bellarby et al., 2008;
CAST, 2004; McKinsey and Company, 2009). By drawing on recent research on nonCO2 emissions and abatement possibilities in global agricultural sectors, this chapter
seeks to complement and extend the existing literature on emission-based BTAs.
Furthermore, to my knowledge, there is no study in the literature which provides
sensitivity analysis of these economic and environmental impacts of BTAs in
agricultural sectors to alternative approaches to measure embodied emissions in
imports15. This chapter aims to fill in this gap in the literature as well.
This essay builds on an extended version of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model
which is documented in Golub et al. (2009). The focus of the BTA analysis presented

15

Burniaux et al. 2010 consider direct and indirect emissions in the context of energy intensive sectors
(EII).
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here is both crop sectors and livestock sectors (see Appendix Tables C1 and C2 for
region and sector aggregation). Following Burniaux et al. (2010), the effects of BTAs
on emission leakage, welfare, and competitiveness are assessed in two regional
configurations: first, with the EU operating alone and second, considering the Annex
I region as a whole. Four scenarios are considered: in the first two scenarios (EU and
Annex1), the EU alone and Annex I as a whole, respectively, impose 27$/tCO2eq
GHG emissions tax on all sectors and provide 27$/tCO2eq carbon sequestration
incentive to forest producers. In the other two scenarios (EU_BTA and Annex1_BTA),
in addition to the GHG emission tax and forest carbon sequestration incentive,
emission-based BTAs are introduced by EU and Annex I, respectively, on all imports
from non-abating regions. None of these policy scenarios includes export rebates.
Because of the vague legal status of export rebates, the policy scenarios in this study
consider import tariffs only. Böhringer et al. (2012) show that inclusion of export
rebates to policy scenarios does not have significant impact on the results of
performance of BTAs on reduction of emissions leakage and recovery of
competitiveness loss.
Similar to earlier studies (Avetisyan et al. 2011, Golub et al. 2012), it is found
that unilateral imposition of an emissions tax changes the pattern of agricultural
sectors competitiveness at the global scale dramatically. Furthermore, the BTAs are
not very effective to relieve the burden of emission taxation on the implementing
regions’ net exports of agricultural products, in both Annex1 and EU27 scenarios. In
Annex1 scenario, emissions leakage through the agricultural sectors is 32%. BTAs
reduce this rate to 13%, which means that the BTA level considered in this essay is

36
not strong enough to fully eliminate the emissions leakage in non-Annex I
agricultural sectors. In EU scenario, on the other hand, 39% emissions leakage in the
agricultural sectors declines to 0.42%. This shows that, similar to what Burniaux et al.
(2010) concluded, the effectiveness of BTAs is reduced with increase in coalition size.
Whereas BTAs are capable of fully eliminating emission leakage when only EU
abates their emissions, this is not the case for the Annex1_BTA scenario.
In this essay, two alternative methods are considered to calculate the
emissions embodied in a product, namely Direct_only approach (D_O), and Direct
and Indirect (D&I) approach. The D_O approach includes only direct emissions from
production processes. More comprehensive method, the D&I approach include total
direct and indirect emissions. Using livestock sectors as an example, total emissions
from primary livestock production are calculated by taking into account direct
emissions from livestock farming and manure management, as well as indirect
emissions from producing feed for animals, growing crops to produce the feed and so
on. In addition to these emissions, processed livestock products also embody
additional emissions from processing and transportation.
The next step in BTA implementation is calculation of emissions embodied in
imported goods. An appropriate portion of the total sector emissions obtained is
assigned to exports of product i from region s to r, based on the share of the bilateral
exports in total region s output of the product in question. The final step is to
calculate the tax on these emissions and apply them to the imports16.

16

See Appendix C for technical details about how BTAs are implemented in the GTAP-AEZ-GHG
model.
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The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model
used in this study. Section 3.3 describes the alternative methods to calculate
emissions associated with production of a good. Section 3.4 presents the scenarios
and results focusing on the effects of BTAs. Section 3.5 discusses sensitivity analysis
of main results. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2

The revised GTAP-AEZ-GHG Model

The GTAP-AEZ-GHG model (Golub et al., 2009) is an integrated framework
that links the agricultural, forestry, food processing and other sectors through land,
and other factor markets and international trade, and incorporates different land-types,
land uses and related GHG emissions and sequestration. (See Chapter 2 of this
dissertation for more description.)
Important extensions of the model for this paper include: (1) updating the
global economic data for the model from 2001 to 2004 (from Version 6 Dimaranan,
2006) to Version 7 (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) of the GTAP Data Base); (2)
increasing the number of global regions from 3 to 19 (see Table A1); (3)
disaggregation of regional ruminant livestock sectors into ruminant meat and dairy; (4)
calibration of the agricultural sectors of the model to disaggregated marginal
abatement cost curves (MACs) that correspond to the new model region and sector
structure; (5) updating forest carbon sequestration supply curves using a new forestry
model that conforms to the regions, AEZ structure and land supply structure of the
CGE model; (6) the model covers carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel
combustion in addition to the methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases
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(F-gases) emissions and forest carbon stock data that were used in three region model.
Modifications 2-6 were incorporated in earlier study (Golub et al. 2012) to analyze
impacts of GHG mitigation policies on livestock sector using version 6 of GTAP data
base. Finally, embodied emissions are included to the base dataset and then new
structure supporting BTAs is introduced to the model (7). In the model, BTA tax
revenue is given back to the household in the abating region.
Unlike other studies on BTA analysis (Burniaux et al. (2010), Winchester
(2011), Hubler (2011), Monjon and Quirion (2011), Weitzel and Peterson (2011),
Seymore et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2011), Bohringer et al. (2012)) I do not aim to
achieve a specific regional emissions reduction since I am focusing on the outcome in
just a few sectors. Instead, following Golub et al. (2012), I exogenously set the carbon
price at 27$/tCO2eq and investigate the effects of the illustrative abatement policy on
leakage and competitiveness in agricultural sectors. Emissions in agriculture are
distinguished not only by sector of origin, but also by driver (e.g., nitrous oxide
emissions from coarse grains production are tied to fertilizer applications; methane
emissions from paddy rice production are tied to land). Other features that
differentiate this study from other BTA analyses include the incorporation of the
forest carbon sequestration and explicit competition for land between agriculture and
forests, and very detailed representation of emissions and abatement options in
agriculture.
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3.3

Two Methods to Calculate Emissions Embodied in Products
3.3.1

Direct_Only Approach (D_O)

D_O is a simple method and includes only direct emissions from production
processes. Using livestock farming sectors as an example, total emissions from
livestock production are calculated by taking into account only direct emissions from
livestock farming and manure management. However, indirect emissions are ignored
such as emissions from producing feed for animals, emissions from growing crops to
produce the feed, emissions from processing and transportation. This method is easy
to implement, and, of the three methods considered, it requires the most parsimonious
computational time and data requirements. On the other hand, the method ignores
indirect emissions and as a result underestimates emissions embodied in a product
which may cause to misleading results. In this essay, it is aimed to investigate how
important to include indirect emissions into embodied emissions calculations.

3.3.2

Direct&Indirect Approach (D&I)

The D&I method considers both direct and indirect emissions. The total of
these emissions are estimated by running the model as a quantity-based, global inputoutput model in which all prices are fixed at their baseline level and output is simply
doubled. With fixed prices, no substitution will occur, and to double the production of
that sector input use in the sector should double as well. This will trigger increases in
the production of those inputs and associated emissions. Of course these rises in
inputs and emissions will not be full 100% unless the expanding sector is the only
user of these inputs. Furthermore, the input supply sectors must also expand their
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purchases, thereby leading to further rounds of emissions, and so on. By solving the
entire model at once the approach captures all of these direct and indirect changes in
emissions (Golub et al., 2010).
In D&I approach, the process described above is conducted for each 29
sectors and 19 regions of the model separately17 which makes 29x19 simulations to
run18. This feature of the model makes it the more computationally demanding but
also the more accurate approach than the D_O method. In terms of modeling and
computing time the D_O approach is simpler than the D&I approach. Therefore, in
this essay, the D&I approach is considered as the main approach of this essay and the
results from this method are compared with the results of the D_O approach. It should
be noted, however, that in BTAs analysis presented below employing the D&I
approach to emissions embodied in a good some emissions will be tax twice.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report regional total, direct and indirect, emissions from
livestock and crop sectors, respectively. The ruminant meat sector (before processing)
is responsible for 2,649 MtCO2eq. Adding 958 from primary non-ruminants and 718
from dairy production results in total 4,325 MtCO2eq emissions from the global
livestock production.
Table 3.2 reports that total emissions from crop sectors amount to 3,303
MtCO2eq. Other agricultural activities (OthAgri) and paddy rice production are the

17

To save computing time, it might be suggested that the procedure might have been conducted for
each sector separately but for all regions together. Why such suggestion would be inaccurate is
discussed in Appendix B.
18

GEMPACK 11.2 (2013), the latest release of the program can run simulations simultaneously
through “Parameter Substitution”. This new feature of the program allows one to automate simulation
runs. See Horridge and Jerie (2013) for more details about how to run large number of simulations and
export those simulation results into a csv file automatically.
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two leading emitters among crop sectors responsible for 1,188 MtCO2eq and 819
MtCO2eq, respectively. Paddy rice in China and Rest of Southeast Asia (R_SE_Asia)
are the two leading contributors among all crop sectors and regions emitting 287 and
159 MtCO2eq, respectively.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also contain the share of direct emissions in the total
emissions in primary livestock and crop sectors output, respectively. Large direct
emission shares in crop sectors may suggest that for those sectors D_O approach may
be sufficient to calculate the emission content of the products accurately. This
hypothesis is analyzed in the next section. In the livestock sectors, on the other hand,
much smaller shares of direct emissions in the total embodied emissions have already
signals that D_O approach is not an appropriate method to calculate the carbon
content of the livestock products.

.
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Table 3.1 Direct and Indirect Emissions Embodied in Primary and Processing Livestock Sectors (MtCO2eq) and Percentage Share of
Direct Emissions in Total (%)
Dairy_Farms Ruminant
value
%
value %
USA
88.87 61
179
79
EU27
138.8 81
185
87
BRAZIL
38.27 91
324
98
CAN
10.13 55
32
89
JAPAN
8.42
68
9
70
CHIHKG
18.07 69
322
94
INDIA
39.04 82
222
95
C_C_Amer
26.58 62
82
93
S_o_Amer
38.71 76
232
98
E_Asia
4.809 56
16
87
Mala_Indo
0.945 85
41
93
R_SE_Asia
3.359 86
79
98
R_S_Asia
41.18 57
140
88
Russia
63.67 66
43
77
Oth_CEE_CIS 84.89 79
71
83
Oth_Europe
6.027 84
5
82
MEAS_NAfr 23.53 68
59
91
S_S_AFR
55.22 98
496
99
Oceania
27.64 86
112
95
TOTAL
718.2
2649

NonRuminant Proc_Dairy
value
%
value %
89.08
63
107
7
121
66
173
7
31.55
77
29
1
10.39
41
12
2
13.46
62
12
10
388.6
45
46
0
26.57
67
26
11
20.15
44
66
1
30.86
61
34
1
22.66
53
7
5
16.87
68
9
3
36.33
65
6
2
27.6
63
26
6
14.16
59
19
9
25.1
47
53
5
1.97
46
6
4
24.36
72
24
3
50.89
86
20
1
6.055
64
32
3
957.6
708

Proc_Rum
value
%
209.3
4
117.3
3
277.3
0
31.08
0
17.6
1
43.12
1
2.366 14
39.05
9
127.6
1
13.17
1
15.83
0
34.5
1
20.29
4
63.91
1
24.12
5
2.276
3
34.07
1
135.7
0
58.22
1
1267

Proc_NonRum
value
%
101
4
155
3
50
0
6
1
7
3
104
1
0
0
7
2
29
1
19
1
3
3
26
4
65
2
6
5
8
4
2
2
10
0
48
0
18
1
662.8
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Table 3.2 Direct and Indirect Emissions Embodied in Crops (MtCO2eq) and Percentage Share of Direct Emissions in Total (%)

USA
EU27
BRAZIL
CAN
JAPAN
CHIHKG
INDIA
C_C_Amer
S_o_Amer
E_Asia
Mala_Indo
R_SE_Asia
R_S_Asia
Russia
Oth_CEE_CIS
Oth_Europe
MEAS_NAfr
S_S_AFR
Oceania
TOTAL

Paddy_Rice
value %
12.32 94
3.25 97
14.65 63
0.01 0
14.95 69
287.32 94
122.66 78
3.40 86
18.50 96
18.69 81
60.47 97
159.37 98
76.53 80
1.71 94
2.39 95
0.00 0
11.23 92
51.35 97
0.85 97
859.65

Wheat
value %
23.02 86
27.28 79
2.54 64
9.94 72
1.06 68
56.46 70
90.33 11
0.59 46
10.60 79
0.81 92
0.02 0
0.12 66
13.69 52
6.34 60
18.12 60
0.44 80
14.66 41
3.17 69
3.22 68
282.4

CrGrains
value %
96.58 86
34.42 83
13.07 75
5.40 75
0.15 65
37.45 70
18.82 8
8.68 48
17.22 81
1.23 79
1.93 33
1.36 71
4.50 68
11.61 64
17.13 63
0.92 80
13.64 52
32.03 79
1.31 66
317.45

Oilseeds
Sugar_Crop
value % value %
40.43 85
3.52 85
21.17 70
11.04 81
52.73 77
11.64 67
9.08 80
0.20 91
0.21 65
0.44 50
28.72 69
5.02 72
54.95 12
14.53 13
1.82 64
3.00 59
35.85 85
2.99 73
0.58 71
0.37 79
4.17 57
0.79 64
0.89 71
1.87 74
3.49 56
4.49 47
1.31 59
0.38 66
4.59 65
4.62 67
0.31 45
0.18 82
2.58 52
1.63 47
3.15 74
11.00 72
0.58 62
1.08 65
266.6
78.788

OthAgri
value %
132.35 83
169.91 78
43.30 75
17.12 81
25.67 65
472.10 71
138.97 12
33.84 50
58.33 78
26.47 69
15.27 35
19.71 74
54.82 45
32.78 64
102.44 62
4.00 70
41.96 51
89.94 79
18.60 61
1497.6
43
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3.4

Scenarios and Impacts of BTAs

3.4.1

Results with D&I Approach

The impacts of the 27$/tCO2eq Annex I emission tax and forest carbon
sequestration subsidy on livestock and crop sectors without and with BTAs can be seen in
Table 3.3 and Figures 3.2 – 3.11. Table 3.3 presents the global welfare changes under
four scenarios: Annex I without BTA, Annex I with BTA, EU without BTA, and EU with
BTA. Welfare impacts of abatement policy and BTAs are measured by Hicksian
equivalent variation in income. Table 3.3 shows that BTAs are effective in shifting
burden of abatement from acting regions to non-acting regions. Welfare loss of Annex I
decreases from 0.2% to 0.1% by implementing BTAs on imports from non-Annex I
regions. On the other hand, welfare loss of non-Annex I increases from 0.16% to 0.7%
with BTAs.
Table 3.3 shows that the increase in the welfare loss with the coalition size is not
as much as Burniaux et al.’s (2010) findings. In Burniaux et al. (2010), global welfare
loss due to the abatement policy increases six-fold from 0.1% to 0.6% as the coalition
expands from EU to Annex I. In this essay, however the global welfare loss increases
only two-fold from 0.1% to only 0.2% with the coalition size. This is an expected result
considering the major difference between the two studies that the emissions price is fixed
at 27$/tCO2eq in our study while it is endogenous and varying between 20$/tCO2eq and
43$/tCO2eq in Burniaux et al. (2010) study (see Table 3.3). Clearly, the larger tax, the
larger is associated welfare loss.
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Table 3.3 Welfare Impacts of BTAs under Different Scenarios for D&I Approach

This
Study

Burniaux
et al.
(2010)

Scenario
Annex1
noBTA
Annex1
BTA
EU noBTA
EU BTA
Annex1
noBTA
Annex1
BTA
EU noBTA
EU BTA

EV (%)
acting

Emissions tax
(USD/tCO2eq)

World

27

-0.2

-0.2

-0.16

27

-0.2

-0.1

-0.7

27
27

-0.1
-0.1

-0.2
-0.2

0.01
-0.1

43.3

-0.6

-0.8

-0.3

43.4

-0.6

-0.6

-0.6

20.9
22.2

-0.1
-0.1

-0.3
-0.2

0
-0.1

non acting

Figures 3.2 - 3.5 show the percentage changes in GHG emissions from livestock
and crop sectors in the two scenarios in Annex I and non-Annex I, respectively. Overall,
non-Annex I livestock and cropping emissions expand in the absence of BTAs. Similar to
findings reported in Ghosh et al. (2012), with BTAs, the picture is reversed dramatically
in Brazil for livestock and crop sectors. This is an expected result considering the fact
that considerable portion of GHG emissions in Brazil are non-CO2 emissions from
agriculture.
Impacts of BTAs on production are illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 for livestock
sectors, Figures 3.8 and 3.9 for crop sectors. BTAs of Annex I affects the production of
Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa (S_S_Afr), Central and Caribbean America (C_C_Amer), and
the rest of South East Asia (R_SE_Asia). The changes in trade balances by livestock
sector and region in both scenarios, presented in Figure 3.10, show that the emissions tax
in Annex I dramatically changes the pattern of global competitiveness (similar finding is
reported in Avetisyan et al., 2011). BTAs are also helpful to reduce negative impact of
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emission tax on livestock sectors net exports. Similar result is observed in crop sectors, as
well (see Figure 3.11).
In addition to the analysis of the impacts of BTAs implemented by Annex I
regions against non-Annex I regions, the analysis of the EU only case is also investigated
in this essay (see Appendix C for the figures of this case). The analysis is important
because the EU is seriously considering the use of BTAs. Results show that as with the
Annex1 scenario, livestock and crop production and emissions in untaxed regions
dramatically expand in the absence of BTAs. Unlike Annex1 case, BTAs implemented by
EU on non-EU products are helpful in supporting agricultural output in EU: reductions in
livestock and crop sectors outputs are smaller with BTAs; and there is even an increase in
the EU paddy rice production. The changes in trade balances by livestock sector and
region for both simulations shows that BTAs implemented by the EU27 are helpful to
relieve the burden of emissions tax on the EU27 livestock sectors net exports.
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Figure 3.1 Changes in Emissions from Livestock Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax
in all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.2 Changes in Emissions from Livestock Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions
Tax in all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.3 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in
all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.4 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax
in all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.5 Changes in Outputs from Livestock Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in
all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.6 Changes in Outputs from Livestock Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions
Tax in all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.7 Changes in Outputs from Crop Sectors in Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in all
Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.8 Changes in Outputs from Crop Sectors in non-Annex I Regions when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in
all Sectors and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure 3.9 Changes in Livestock Sector Trade Balances when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and
Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (mill 2004 USD)
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Figure 3.10 Changes in Crop Sector Trade Balances when Annex I implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and
Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (mill 2004 USD)
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3.4.2

Impacts of BTAs under D&I versus D_O Approaches

3.4.2.1 Welfare Change
In this section, impacts of BTAs on key variables are compared when the total of
emissions in products contains either only direct emissions (D_O approach) or both direct
and indirect emissions (D&I approach). Figure 3.13 shows the comparison. As expected,
ignoring indirect emissions in total emission calculations causes the impact of BTAs on
global welfare changes to be underestimated. D_O approach estimates the global welfare
losses because of climate policy with BTA application in Annex I to be 77,554 million
USD. However, D&I approach estimates 82,420 million USD. Clearly, underestimation
of embodied emissions in D_O approach leads BTAs to impose less distortion to the
economy and hence the overall welfare loss would be underestimated. Underestimation
of carbon content of products also causes recovery impacts of BTAs on welfare of BTA
implementer regions to be underestimated. According to results shown in Figure 3.13,
largest underestimation of positive impacts of BTAs on implementer-county’s economy
occurs in the US and the EU in Annex1_BTA scenario. Parallel to this analysis, omitting
the indirect emissions in the carbon content of imports leads polluting countries, such as
China, to be less effected from BTA application. It is a trivial result that the level of
underestimation of impacts on welfare changes increases when the EU is the only BTA
implementing region.

EV (USA 2004 million)
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Figure 3.11 Welfare Impacts of BTAs under D&I versus D_O Approaches

3.4.2.2 Emission Leakage Rate
The emissions leakage rate is defined as the ratio of additional GHG emissions in
non-abating regions (non-Annex I countries in Annex1 scenario) to the emission
reduction achieved by the abating countries (Annex I countries in Annex1 scenario).
Table 3.4 presents the emissions leakage at $27/tCO2eq emission tax with and without
BTA cases for three total emission calculation methods. Results show that under D&I
approach, without BTAs, emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors because of
climate policy of Annex I are 45% and 16%, respectively. When the EU is the only GHG
abating region, emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors become 52% and 16%,
respectively. When the EU implement BTAs, the emission leakage rate in crop sectors
drops down to -13%, which means that emissions in non-EU crop sectors are also
reduced under BTAs. With BTAs, imports from non-EU become more expensive and EU
demand for these products falls, which in turn leads to reduction in non-EU output and
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emissions19. Although BTAs do not have the reverse leakage effect on livestock sectors,
they are still powerful enough to make remarkable impacts on the leakage rate in those
sectors. Namely, emission leakage in non-EU livestock sectors decreases from 52% to
8%. Finally, BTAs applied by the EU reduce economy–wide emissions leakage from 19%
to 2%.
In D&I method, BTAs implemented by Annex I reduce emissions leakage rate in
livestock and crop sectors 20% and 5%, respectively. Under Annex I BTAs, D_O
approach calculates the leakage rates in livestock and crop sectors as 26% and 10%,
respectively. Comparing these results to the findings of D&I approach reveals an
expected result: ignoring indirect emissions in products hurts the effectiveness of BTAs
and hence D_O approach finds less recovery impact of BTAs on emissions leakages in
non-Annex I regions.
Table 3.4 also shows a result consistent with findings of Burniaux et al. (2010).
Like Burniaux et al. (2010), when considering all sectors (both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors) our results show that BTAs are very effective in reducing emission
leakage but their effectiveness decreases as coalition size increases. BTAs are capable to
almost fully eliminate emission leakage when only EU27 regions abate their emissions:
emission leakage reduces from 19% to 2%. However, when coalition expands from EU27
to Annex 1, BTAs reduce leakage rates from 11% to 4%.

19

In the model, it is assumed that the emissions intensity of imports is fixed. Under such assumption, BTAs
cannot change behavior of exporters by promoting exporters to use less pollutant inputs (which reduces
their emission intensity of their product). Therefore, in this study, the only way to reduce emissions for
punished countries is to reduce their production.
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Table 3.4 Emissions Leakage under 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax in All Sectors and Forest
Carbon Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
Approach
Without
BTA
D&I
D_only

Policy
Scenarios
Annex1
EU
Annex1_BTA
EU_BTA
Annex1_BTA
EU_BTA

Cropping
16
16
5
-13
10
-4

Only farm
livestock

All
livestock

All
Agriculture

All
sectors

47
54
21
8

45
52
20
8

32
39
13
0.42

11
19
4
2

27

26

19

6

17

17

9

6

Note: “Only farm livestock” includes only primary livestock sectors (dairy, ruminant and nonruminant). All livestock includes both processed and unprocessed livestock sectors.

When both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are considered, Burniaux et al.
(2010) find that leakage rates in scenarios EU noBTA and Annex I noBTA are 3.8% and
4.4%, respectively. However, corresponding rates in this study are 19% and 11%,
respectively. Mapping between Burniaux et al. and the GTAP-AEZ-GHG aggregation is
not perfect. In Burniaux’s et al. study, the energy intensive industries (EIIs) are chemicals,
metallurgic, other metal, iron and steel industry, paper and mining products. In GTAPAEZ-GHG aggregation, chemicals, metallurgic, other metal, iron and steel industry are
clustered within En_Int_Ind. However, paper products sector is included in Oth_Ind_Se
aggregate, and represents only small part of the aggregate. Mining is within OthPrimSect.
However, fisheries which is not energy intensive industry, is also within OthPrimSect.
Therefore, in this study, only En_Int_Ind is considered as EII sectors.
Burniaux et al. (2010) described two channels of carbon leakage: international
trade and fossil-fuel price. International trade related leakage occurs as emissionintensive sectors in abating regions lose their market shares because of abatement policies
to their rivals in non-abating regions. Fossil-fuel price related carbon leakage occurs as
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carbon taxes in abating regions reduce domestic demand for fossil fuels and price of
fossil fuel in global markets which leads to greater fossil fuels use and hence higher GHG
emissions in non-abating regions. Therefore, Burniaux et al. explain the negative
relationship between effectiveness of BTAs on leakage and coalition size by (1) under
smaller coalitions, carbon leakage mostly occurs because of the international trade
channel rather than the fossil-fuel price channel; and (2) BTAs address the former but not
the latter channel.
When I decompose emission leakage, I find that, the nature of emission leakage
does change over the coalition size (see Figure 3.14). In scenario EU without BTA, 18%
carbon leakage breaks into 14% international trade channel and 4% fossil-fuel price
channel. In scenario Annex1 without BTA, 11% total carbon leakage breaks into 6.8%
international trade channel and 4.6% fossil-fuel price channel. The contribution of the
fossil-fuel price channel to carbon leakage increases in absolute terms with coalition size,
but is stable relative to the abatement target (it is about 5% in both EU and Annex I
mitigation scenarios). The international trade channel remains the main channel of carbon
leakage in my analysis as the coalition is expanded from EU to Annex I. However,
relative contribution of the international trade channel is reduced as the coalition expands.
Thus I find support for the Burniaux et al.’s (2010) observation that under smaller
coalitions, carbon leakage mostly occurs because of the international trade channel rather
than the fossil-fuel price channel.
Further, in EU_BTA scenario, the leakage rate is almost eliminated completely
and in Annex I_BTA leakage rate is reduced from 11% to 4%. Decomposition of the
leakage rates in those scenarios shows that BTAs reduce leakage through the
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international trade channel (negative blue bars) while leakage through fossil fuel prices
increases in both EU_BTA and Annex1_BTA scenarios. Overall, I find a negative
relationship between effectiveness of BTAs and coalition size, and my results support
Burniaux et al.’s (2010) explanation for this negative relationship.

Decompose of Emissions Leakage (%)

Decomposed Emission Leakage Rates in D&I approach
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Figure 3.12 Decomposition of Leakage Rate in All Sectors to International TradeChannel and Fossil Fuel Price-channel, Under 27$/tCO2eq Emission Tax on All Sectors
and Forest Carbon Sequestration Incentive (%)

3.5

Sensitivity Analysis

In the model, it is assumed that commodities are differentiated according to their
origin (Armington (1969)). Therefore, leakage rates are particularly sensitive to the
values of Armington elasticities of substitution amongst imports from different sources.
The size of international trade channel of emissions leakage is represented by the
Armington elasticities. In this study, they are taken from the GTAP 6.2 database. The
econometric estimates of the Armington elasticities provided in Hertel et al. (2007) are
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used in this modeling work20. In this section, I explore how the emissions leakage rates in
four different climate policies depend on the Armington elasticities when the values of
the parameter are systematically increased and decreased by two standard deviations to
higher and lower values. I do this to check the robustness of our results to the value of
Armington elasticities.
The overall sensitivity analysis shows that the results on the effectiveness of
BTAs to control emissions leakage are robust to alternative values of Armington
elasticities. As expected, leakage rates increase with increases in the Armington
elasticities. As imported products become closer substitutes for the domestic goods,
unilateral abatement policy implemented in the home country results in switch in the
demand from domestic to imported product, expansion of production in non-participating
countries, and increase in emission leakage. On the other hand, as domestic and imported
products are less substitutable, the leakage rates are limited. For low Armington
elasticities, the leakage rate in livestock sectors decreases from 47% to 30% in Annex I
noBTA scenario and from 52% to 35% in EU noBTA scenario. Similarly, the leakage rate
in crop sectors decreases from 16% to 10% in Annex I noBTA scenario and from 16% to
11% in EU noBTA scenario. The results also reveal that BTAs become more effective at
reducing emission leakage as the Armington elasticities decrease. In the Annex1case, in
primary livestock sector for example, while emissions leakage rate decreases from 47%
to 21% with BTAs in original Armington elasticities case, it decreases from 60% to 32%
with BTAs and high Armington Elasticity. On the other hand, in the same scenario for

20

See Table C3 for mapping between the 40 sectors in Hertel et al. (2007) and 29 sectors in my model.
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low Armington Elasticities, the emission leakage rate decreases from 31% to 7% when
BTAs are implemented.

Table 3.5 Sensitivity Analysis of Leakage Rates with respect to Armington Elasticities
#

Policy
Scenarios

Annex1
Annex1 BTA
1
EU
EU BTA
Annex1
Annex1 BTA
2
EU
EU BTA
Annex1
Annex1 BTA
3
EU
EU BTA

original
AE

High AE

Low AE

Cropping
16
5
16
-13
20
8
19
-14
10
0.5
11
-13

3.6

Only farm
livestock

All
livestock

All
Agriculture

All
sectors

47
21
54
8
60
32
70
21
31
7
36
-7

45
20
52
8
58
31
67
20
30
7
35
-6

32
13
39
0.42
40
20
50
8
21
4
26
-9

11
4
19
2
14
6
24
3
8
3
14
0.1

Conclusions

As the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) negotiations have thus far
failed to secure an extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012, there is growing
momentum for unilateral GHG emissions mitigation policies which should satisfy two
conditions: (1) minimize home country loss of its market shares in the global markets; (2)
minimize carbon leakage in global emissions. By design, simple GHG emissions
abatement policies cannot satisfy these conditions and hence additional mechanisms such
as Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) are required. They allow individual countries or
cohorts of countries to pursue unilateral market-based policies without harming their
competitiveness while reducing the risks of leakage.
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It is quite popular in the literature to measure the effectiveness of BTAs at
competitiveness and leakage issues for manufacturing sectors under various abatement
scenarios. However, no study making similar investigation in agricultural sectors is
available. Considering the fact that those sectors are the significant sources of non-CO2
emissions, understanding performance of BTAs in controlling competitiveness and
emission leakage for those sectors is important. Therefore, the main goal of this essay is
to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the impacts of BTAs on competitiveness and
emissions leakage in livestock and crop sectors under different abatement scenarios.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of these results to key model parameters such as Armington
Elasticity and alternative emission content calculations is also tested.
The results indicate that BTAs are quite an effective tool for controlling emissions
leakage in agriculture and other sectors. Further, in some case these tools can even
reverse emissions leakage. However, the same effectiveness of BTAs is not found with
respect to competitiveness loss or welfare changes.
Consistent with Burniaux’s et al. (2010) findings, I find that power of BTAs
decreases with the coalition size, i.e., as the number of regions in a coalition for
controlling their emissions increases effectiveness of BTAs at limiting emission leakage
decreases. Decomposition of the leakage rates in the climate policy scenarios shows that
BTAs reduce leakage through the international trade channel while leakage through
fossil-fuel prices is unaffected in Annex I BTA scenario and even increases in EU BTA.
Sensitivity analysis results with respect to the Armington elasticities show that the
emissions leakage rates are quite robust to the changes in this parameter. However no
such robustness is observed for the alternative carbon content calculations. Ignoring
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indirect emissions embodied in imports changes dramatically the conclusions regarding
the performance of BTAs in controlling emissions leakages. When both direct and
indirect emissions are considered in emission content calculation the results show that
BTAs are effective tools to almost eliminate emissions leakages in all sectors including
livestock and crop sectors. However, when embodied emissions are underestimated by
ignoring indirect emissions in products, the effectiveness of BTAs in fight with leakage
seems to vanish. Therefore, I conclude that when assessing performance of emissionbased BTAs on economic and environmental variables, inclusion of indirect emissions
into emission content calculation is crucial.
As a technical detail, on the other hand, measuring total direct and indirect
emissions for each sector and for each region separately does not change the assessment
results about the performance of BTAs. Thus, calculation of total direct and indirect
emissions for each sector separately but for all regions together brings computational
convenience without making any vital change in the results.
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CHAPTER 4. EMISSION-BASED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS VERSUS
PUNITIVE TARIFFS: THEIR COMPARISON IN TERMS OF CREDIBILITY
AND EFFECTIVENESS IN A GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION
AGREEMENT

4.1

Introduction

Implementation of policies for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by a given
country may increase domestic prices, induce international production displacement, and
result in spatial relocation instead of reduction of GHG emissions; a phenomenon known
as “emission leakage”. This loss of competitiveness without the corresponding
environmental gain has deterred countries form implementing unilateral carbon
abatement policies. Therefore policy measures that may prevent leakage have been
considered as an important part of climate agreements.
Two policy measures to address leakage widely discussed in the literature and
policy forums are punitive tariffs and border tax adjustments. The former consist of a
tariff imposed on all imports from countries that do not take appropriate measures to
reduce emissions. These tariffs are decoupled from the specific carbon content of the
imported good and are designed to punish free-riders. A border tax adjustment (BTA) is a
tax levied by emission-abating countries on imports from non-abating countries
according to the emissions associated with their production process.21

21

This idea was incorporated into the Waxman/Markey bill (H.R.2454‘‘The American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009’’) as a requirement for purchasing ‘‘international reserve allowances’’ to cover goods
imported from countries that have not undertaken adequate steps to mitigate GHG emissions (Section766).
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While the consistency of BTAs with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules is
still under debate (Biermann and Brohm, 2005; Brewer, 2010; Frankel, 2005; Goh, 2004;
Hoerner, 1998) some authors argue in favor of the use of trade measures in the context of
international environmental agreements specifically on the basis of efficiency gains
accrued by their implementation (Stiglitz, 2006; Kopp and Pizer, 2007; Ismer and
Neuhoff, 2007).22 An alternative argument underscores the importance of these measures
to reduce “leakage” of emissions through spatial reallocation of carbon-intensive
industries to low-tax countries and, as a corollary, to protect competitiveness in high-tax
countries (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2008; Goh, 2004; Hoerner, 1998; Demailly and
Quirion, 2008; Winchester, 2012). Other studies (Fischer and Fox, 2012; Bohringer et al.,
2010; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2008; Babiker and Rutherford, 2005) have also compared
emission-based BTAs to other border adjustments and domestic instruments (export
rebates, full border adjustment, output-based rebating) on the basis of its effect on
competitiveness (measured by net exports or domestic output) and overall emissions.
A potentially important but typically overlooked benefit of implementing BTAs is
associated with the fact that they may encourage free riders to join a greenhouse gas
abatement agreement (Nordhaus, 1998; Brack et al., 2000; Hotelez, 2007; Charnovitz,
2003). Although this hypothesis has been theoretically formalized (Barrett, 1997; Finus
and Rundshagen; 2000), its empirical assessment remains limited.23 An empirical
evaluation of this hypothesis involves quantification of welfare changes of countries in
22

Stiglitz (2006) argues that this is consistent with World Trade Organization rules because products from
countries that allow unconstrained emissions are implicitly subsidized. Perez (2005) analyses the legality of
trade sanctions in this context and concludes that the WTO will not interfere with such tariffs.
23

Kemfert (2004) analyses the effectiveness of trade measures to sustain an environmental agreement.
However this study only considers banning trade and does not discuss punitive tariffs or BTAs.
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the context of a climate agreement including BTAs imposed on free riders. In fact, the
welfare measures presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrate that BTAs are
effective in shifting burden of abatement from acting regions to non-acting regions (see
Table 3.3). Hübler (2011) considers a situation in which abating countries impose BTAs
equal to the domestic carbon tax and measures their impact on the welfare of punished
countries’ (all developing countries) with particular emphasis on China. Weitzel and
Peterson (2011) also analyze the impact of BTAs (assumed equal to domestic carbon
price resulting from a cap and trade system) on the welfare of free riders but does not
compare this with the level of welfare those countries would achieve under cooperation
with the climate agreement. Finally Manders and Veenendaal (2008) consider welfare
implications of the imposition of BTAs (equivalent to the prevailing carbon tax rate) on
free riders by Annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol. However the analysis does not
explicitly considers USA’s incentives to participate but rather simply assumes its
participation or lack thereof.
These studies did not consider the incentive compatibility of a climate agreement
including BTAs for the two largest emitters in the world: the United States and China.
The lack of abatement efforts by these countries seriously undermines the efficiency of
any international climate agreement. The efficiency and competitiveness implications of
China’s lack of abatement efforts have been stated as reasons for the USA’s failure to
comply with an international climate agreement. The objective of the present study is to
conduct empirical assessment of the hypothesis that trade sanctions in the form of BTAs,
used by the U.S. against China, may constitute a viable enforcement mechanism to
sustain compliance with a range of emissions targets in the context of agreements to curb
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global GHG emissions. The case of trade sanctions between USA and China is
particularly relevant due to the strength and magnitude of the bilateral trade flow. In
addition considering the fact that the Chinese economy is both emissions as well as
export intensive, the U.S. may potentially induce China to abate GHGs through the use of
BTAs.
Empirical assessment of our hypothesis requires consideration of strategic
behavior. Border adjustments (regardless of whether they are designed to induce
cooperation by free riders or simply as a leakage reduction tool) are implemented only if
coalition countries are better off after their implementation and will prevent free riding if
and only if non-signatory countries are better off implementing the carbon reduction
policy than not implementing it and facing border adjustments. Game theory has
formalized both conditions and labeled them the credibility and the effectiveness
conditions respectively.
Assessment of the viability of BTAs as a free riding deterrent mechanism requires
estimation of the effect of these policies on markets’ equilibrium. Markets all over the
world are interconnected (e.g. commodities, food, energy) and, when policies have the
ability to significantly change terms of trade and the flow of goods across borders,
estimation of market effects of policies requires a general equilibrium approach. A
general equilibrium model is employed to calculate the range of carbon taxes that can be,
credibly and effectively, supported by emission-based BTAs and assess its sensitivity to
technological parameters (i.e. Armington elasticities). From a range of viable emissionbased BTAs the most cost-effective level is identified (i.e. the level that maximizes the
punisher’s equivalent variation). I then compare the merits of emission-based BTAs (in
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terms of stability and cost-effectiveness) relative to a widely speculated alternative which
has been evaluated in the literature (Barrett, 2003; Perez, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006; Perez,
2007) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation, namely punitive tariff.
Evaluating the hypothesis that BTAs could help deter free riding should shed light
into many questions that remain open in the scientific literature: (1) Can emission-based
BTAs be used as a viable (i.e. credible and effective) enforcement mechanism for
international GHG mitigation agreements and what are the carbon tax levels that can be
supported through its implementation? (2) What are the environmental and market
implications of ignoring indirect emissions in taxing imports? (3) How do emission-based
BTAs compare, on the basis of its stability and cost-effectiveness as an enforcement
mechanism, with alternative mechanisms such as punitive tariffs? (4) What is the most
cost-effective level of emission-based BTAs?

4.2

Methodology

One of the goals of this chapter is compare the results found here with the results
of Chapter 2. Therefore, to be consistent with Chapter 2, the model and the game
structure used in Chapter 2 is used in this chapter, as well. Namely, the analysis employs
the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model with the GTAP Version 6 Database aggregated up to 3
regions and 24 sectors.
The only modification made to the original model is introduction of BTAs
described in detail in Appendix C. To calculate the embodied emissions of products
which is required to determine the BTAs, the D&I approach is used which is described in
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detail in Chapter 3. This approach calculates the emissions embodied in products as the
total of direct and indirect emissions for each sector and region separately.
For the game structure, the same three-stage game used in Chapter 2 is also used
in this chapter. In Stage 1, the U.S. and ROW implement a mitigation policy and China
plays a default strategy of no emissions reduction. In Stage 2, the U.S. observes China’s
free-ridding and threatens it by imposing BTAs on all imports from China. In Stage 3,
China observes the global emissions tax level and the BTA threat from the U.S. and
decides whether or not to comply with the emissions tax (see Figure 4.1).
USA & ROW
Stage 1
USA

USA

Stage 2

CHN

D

0, ∞

CHN
Stage 3
free-ride

comply
&

&

'

'

Figure 4.1 The Game Tree

Welfare changes are used to measure the payoffs of the regions. The GTAP-AEZGHG model is employed to quantify welfare and total emission changes associated with
different combinations of strategies considered in the analysis. Concept of equivalent
variation (EV) is applied to measure changes in the welfare of the regions24. Thus,
,D
24

,

,

In the model, the regional household’s EV is equal to the difference between the expenditure required to
obtain new (post-simulation) level of utility at initial prices and initial expenditure. McDougall (2001)
documents EV calculation in the GTAP model.
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is the equivalent variation of region

{

,

,

} when the emissions tax set by

the U.S. and ROW is , the percentage change in the power of import tariffs25 imposed
by the U.S. on Chinese imports if China free-rides is D
given the U.S.’s threat is

= {

, !"#$%}.

4.3

[0, ∞ , and China’s action

Results

To assess the credibility of a tariff threat we start by assuming a stringent
abatement policy and ask whether imposition of BTAs on Chinese imports (if China free
rides) constitutes a credible threat. We do this by assuming that the global emissions tax
is $20 per ton of carbon equivalent (TCE) and calculating EV for the U.S. at $1/TCE
increments in the BTAs.
In addition, we assume that the marginal damage from pollution is $10/TCE.26
Unlike the methodology used in Chapter 2 for punitive tariffs, in this chapter marginal
damages of pollution is also taken into account. The reason for such modification is
further discussed later in this section. It should also be noted that in this essay it is not
assumed that marginal damage of pollution in China should equal the corresponding
emissions tax as marginal damages are heterogeneous under free riding.
Marginal damages are factored in the EV calculation by using the following
procedure. At a given emissions tax , and marginal damage of pollution τ, a BTA
imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is incentive compatible for the U.S. when
25

Power of a tax, by definition, is the ratio of the price with tax over the price without tax, i.e., equal to the
tax rate plus one. Thus, if the power of tax is greater than one, the implemented rate is really a tax, and
when the power of tax is less than one, the implemented rate is a subsidy.

26

The choice of this marginal damage will be discussed in further detail below.
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the cost of implementing the threat is lower than its benefits, rendering a higher
equivalent variation to the U.S. That is
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when emissions tax is c, China’s action is a, and level of

threat is BTA. The impact of damage of pollution on U.S.’s welfare is determined by the
marginal cost of pollution (I) and difference between the baseline global emissions and
global emissions when USA punishes
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Similarly, a BTA imposed by the U.S. against Chinese products is effective if
China achieves a higher EV when complying with the global GHG mitigation agreement
than free riding and receiving the punishment from the U.S. That is
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the global GHG emissions when China free rides and receives BTA level of punishment.
The impact of damage of pollution on China’s welfare, on the other hand, is determined
by the marginal damage of pollution (I) and difference between the global emissions
when USA punishes China’s free-ride at the given level of BTA ( KL M , D

0,

) and global emissions when China complies ( KL M , D

=

>

0, !"#$% ). When these equalities are inserted into the effectiveness condition we
obtain
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Figure 4.2 shows how the U.S.’s EV changes with the BTAs imposed on Chinese
imports under $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution. Results reveal that any BTA above
$139/TCE reduces the U.S. welfare to a level lower than in the scenario without BTAs
(black line in Figure 4.2). These figures suggest that, under an emission tax of $20/TCE
and the marginal damage from pollution is $10/TCE, the threat of BTAs is credible as
long as they do not exceed $139/TCE. Figure 4.2 illustrates the concept of credibility.
However the maximum level of BTAs at or below which a threat is credible will likely
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change as the level of the carbon tax changes.
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Figure 4.2 USA's EV ($ US million) for a Range of BTAs under $20/TCE Emissions Tax
and $10/TCE Marginal Damage from Pollution

We also verify the effectiveness of a BTA threat by initially assuming that the
global emissions tax is $20/TCE and varying the BTAs in $1/TCE increments. Figure 4.3
illustrates China’s EV for a range of BTAs imposed by the U.S. on all imports from
China when marginal cost of pollution is $10/TCE. As the U.S. increases the BTA level
China’s EV decreases. However, up to $20/TCE BTA, China’s welfare loss due to the
punishment of BTAs does not exceed the welfare loss associated with abatement. In other
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words, under the assumption that both ROW and the U.S. are taxing emissions at
$20/TCE in all sectors and provide forest carbon sequestration incentives at that carbon
price, BTAs at or above $20/TCE can induce China to comply with the abatement
agreement and impose a $20/TCE tax on its own emissions. Therefore, $20/TCE is the

EV of CHINA (USD million)

minimum BTA that is effective at the given emission tax.
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Figure 4.3 China's EV (USD million) for a Range of BTAs under $20/TCE Emission Tax
and $10 Marginal Damage from Pollution

When results illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are brought together, we find that
under an emission tax of $20/TCE and marginal damage of pollution of $10/TCE, BTAs
between $20/TCE and $139/TCE constitute both credible and effective threats and may,
thus, be used as a viable enforcement mechanism in an international environmental
agreement. However, it is unclear if the existence of BTA levels that are both credible
and effective is robust to the level of carbon tax. If the size of the set of credible and
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effective threats depends upon the level of the carbon tax then it is of the upmost
importance to calculate the maximum carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs.
We analyze the systematic link between carbon taxes and credible and effective
BTAs that can enforce them by repeating the analysis of Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for a range
of emissions taxes. Combinations of emissions taxes and BTAs for which a threat is both
credible and effective are displayed in Figure 4.4. Calculation of credible and effective
BTAs requires assumptions on the marginal damage from pollution faced by the US and
China. When the marginal damage of pollution is assumed to be zero, Figure 4.4 reveals
that $21.50/TCE is the maximum enforceable emissions tax (MET), i.e., the point at
where the credibility and effectiveness curves intersect each other. Current CO2 price in
the EU market is around €7 which makes carbon (C) price around $35/TCE with
exchange rate 1.32 $/€. This means that the current emissions tax in the real world is
already above the MET under zero marginal damage of pollution.
Figure 4.4 depicts the boundaries of the effectiveness set when marginal damage
from pollution is $5/TCE, $10/TCE, and $15/TCE. These figures for marginal damage
from pollution are taken from Nordhaus (2011). Nordhaus presents estimates of marginal
damage of pollution faced by China under six different scenarios. These scenarios
capture a range of time horizons and discount rates. In particular marginal damage
estimates range from $3/TCE to $20/TCE, with a mean of about $10/TCE. Values chosen
here range from $0/TCE to $15/TCE to assess the robustness of our conclusions to
assumptions on those estimates. Combinations of tax rates and BTAs above these
boundaries achieve effectiveness; i.e. China is better off complying and avoiding the
BTA than free riding and receiving the punishment. Therefore the boundaries depict the
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minimum BTA that can convince China to comply at a given emission tax. The
effectiveness curves are convex and monotonically increasing. This is an expected result
considering the fact that as the environmental policy becomes more stringent it becomes
more costly for China to abate and hence the minimum BTA that can induce China to
abate increases.
The credibility curve is also depicted in Figure 4.4. This curve represents the
maximum BTA that the U.S. is willing to implement against China at different levels of
carbon tax. The combinations of tax rates and BTAs below that line fulfill the credibility
condition; i.e. the U.S. is better off implementing the BTA than not implementing it when
China is free riding. Interestingly, the range of BTAs that are credible is insensitive to the
level of the carbon tax.
As revealed by this figure, the set of effective threats is highly sensitive to the
marginal damage from pollution. In particular, Figure 4.4 shows that as damages from
pollution are factored in, the effectiveness curve is shifted downwards. This is because
China’s welfare under free riding is not only decreased by the BTA but also by the
damage from additional pollution. The credibility line is slightly affected by the size of
marginal damages. As the marginal damage of pollution increases the credibility line
shifts upward (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Credibility Thresholds under Different Marginal Damage of Pollution ($/TCE)
Marginal Damage of
Pollution
Credibility Threshold
0
137
5
138
10
139
15
140
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The intersection between the credibility and effectiveness curves indicates the
maximum carbon tax for which there still exist at least one level of BTA that can credible
and effectively enforce such tax rate. Let us define this intersection as the maximum
enforceable (with BTAs) carbon tax, MET. As revealed by results in Figure 4.4 the MET
increases as the marginal damage from pollution increases. In other words, as the
marginal damage from pollution increases, BTAs become a viable enforcement
mechanism for increasingly stringent carbon policies. Moreover the effect of marginal
cost of pollution on MET increases as marginal cost increases. According to Figure 4.4 a
$5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution from $0 to $5/TCE increases MET by $8
(from $22/TCE to $30/TCE). However a $5/TCE increase in marginal cost of pollution
from $10 to $15/TCE increases MET by $13 (from $40/TCE to $53/TCE).
An additional legal constraint may limit the range of BTAs that the punishing
country can impose.27 As discussed by Fischer and Fox (2012) the National Treatment
principle embedded in Article III of the GATT requires that imported goods be treated no
less favorably than “like” domestic products. Many scholars interpret this to mean that
the BTA cannot exceed the domestic carbon tax and assume a BTA that is equal to the
carbon tax (e.g. Hübler, 2011; Weitzel and Peterson, 2011; Fischer and Fox, 2012). This
is, however, hardly a definitive interpretation of the rules and regulations as the general
exceptions clause in Article XX may provide some leniency to punishing countries. This
clause recognizes exceptions when, among other reasons, “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health” and “necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provision of this Agreement”. Moreover
27

This legal constraint applies to BTAs but not, for instance, punitive tariffs.
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the overall carbon tax imposed on imports is determined by the product of the carbon
intensity estimated and the tax rate applied. Even if the latter cannot surpass the domestic
carbon price, the former is also a policy choice. Therefore there is technically no limit to
a BTA as the “effective” border adjustment can be scaled up or down by changing the
estimated carbon intensity.
To consider a situation in which the BTA is forced to equal the domestic carbon
tax, a 45 degree line is depicted in Figure 4.4. The most important question here is
whether the 45 degree line is contained inside the boundaries of credible and effective
BTAs or not. If it is contained, then there exist at least one level of BTA that is credible
and effective and can be considered in compliance with the strictest interpretation of
GATT’s rules. Figure 4.4 shows that the 45 degree line is not contained in the credibility
and effectiveness set when marginal damage from pollution is zero. This is to be
expected. The punished country is better off free riding and accepting a BTA since this
only affects its exports. Complying and imposing a carbon tax would affect its entire
production. It also indicates that if players follow GATT and China does not care about
pollution, then set of credible and effective BTAs is null.
It is evident from Figure 4.4 that the 45 degree line will be contained in the
credible and effective set for a high enough marginal damage of pollution. A key value
here is the minimum marginal damage for which the intersection between the credibility
and effectiveness set and the 45 degree line would be non-empty. Our calculations
indicate that such value is equal to $2.09/TCE which is calculated by
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This result is encouraging as it reveals that BTAs may constitute a viable (i.e. credible
and effective) enforcement mechanism even if legally constrained to be equal to the
domestic carbon tax.
A less optimistic view emerges when the issue becomes the maximum carbon tax
that can be credibly and effectively supported by a legally constrained BTA. Let us
denote this tax rate by METL. As shown in Figure 4, when the marginal damage from
pollution is $5/TCE, the maximum carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs (i.e. the
METL) is $7/TCE; not a highly stringent carbon policy by most standards. The METL is,
however, highly sensitive to the marginal damage from pollution. In fact, when marginal
damage is $10/TCE, the METL increases from $7/TCE to $20/TCE and when marginal
damage is $15/TCE, the METL is $37/TCE.
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Results in Figure 4.4 also reveal that the set of credible and effective threats
shrinks, in all scenarios, as the emission tax increases and becomes empty beyond MET.
Therefore our results suggest a potential trade-off between stability and efficiency; i.e.
the set of credible and effective threats is diminished or may even disappear if complete
internalization of external damages from GHG emissions requires an abatement level
higher than that provided by MET.
Another goal of this work is to assess the cost-effective levels of BTAs for the
U.S. The threshold for the credibility condition is the maximum BTA at which the U.S. is
better of applying the punishment. However, it is also important to determine the costeffective BTA for the U.S. economy which is the BTA at which the U.S. achieves the
lowest welfare loss because of the GHG mitigation and punishment. Note that in this
study optimal BTA cannot be determined because it requires determination of optimal
emission tax which we do not conduct. In our analysis, we determine carbon-based BTAs
that are both credible and effective at a given level of emission tax. Therefore,
determination of the carbon tax that achieves efficiency is not a part of this analysis. The
cost-effective threats used by the U.S. against China over a range of emissions taxes is
$65/TCE (see Figure 4.4).
So far, we have discussed the importance of the existence of BTAs that are both
credible and effective but our analysis has remained silent regarding the “best” level of
BTA within this set. By definition, the punisher country will prefer to impose the costeffective BTA if possible. It is important to note that, the punisher country will be able to
implement the cost effective level of BTA if such rate is below the credibility and above
the effectiveness thresholds. Though the cost-effective BTA is always (i.e. for all levels
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of carbon tax) below the credibility threshold it may or may not be above the
effectiveness threshold depending on the level of the carbon tax. In particular there is a
maximum carbon tax (where the cost-effectiveness line intersects the credibility threshold)
above which the cost-effective BTA is not high enough to constitute an effective threat.
On the other hand, Figure 4.4 suggests that as the marginal damage from pollution
increases so does the range of carbon taxes for which the cost-effective BTA constitutes
an effective and credible threat.
Finally, the 45 degree line and the cost-effective BTA line never intersect within
the credible and effective set of BTAs for marginal damages 15$/TCE and below. Even
at a marginal damage from pollution of $15/TCE the lines do not intersect within this set.
This means that if indeed the rules of GATT preclude the imposition of BTAs above the
domestic carbon tax, then the United States cannot rely on the cost-effective BTA to
induce China to comply. In order to conduct a credible threat the US will be forced to
threat China with a BTA higher than the cost-effective. This is, however, not of great
concern because, as long as the threat is credible and effective, the US will never have to
actually implement the threat. Therefore no welfare losses have to be incurred in when
using BTAs as enforcement mechanism for an international climate agreement.

4.4

Sensitivity Analysis

Our model employs an Armington specification of international trade (Armington,
1969), and commodities produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes28. The

28

See Section 2.4 of this dissertation for further discussion about Armington assumption in the model.
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econometric estimates of the Armington elasticities provided in Hertel et al. (2007) are
used in this modeling work. In this section, we explore how the thresholds of BTAs and
emissions tax depend on the Armington elasticities when the values of the parameter are
systematically increased and decreased by two standard deviations to higher and lower
values. We do this to check the robustness of our results to the value of Armington
elasticities. It is found that when marginal damage of pollution is not taken into account
the qualitative pattern of the thresholds of BTAs and emission taxes are quite robust to
alternative values of the Armington elasticities (see Table 4.2).29

Table 4.2 Thresholds of BTA and Emissions Tax under Varying Armington Elasticities
Trade elasticities
Emissions tax ($/TCE)
BTA ($/TCE)
Mean
21.50
137
High
18.50
126
Low
23.50
148

Figure 4.5 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations estimated by
Hertel et al. (2007). For now, the damage of pollution is ignored. As revealed by Figure
4.5, the increase in Armington elasticities shrinks the size of credible and effective threats.
As the Armington elasticities increase, commodities with different origins become more
substitutable and hence the market power effect of BTAs vanishes. In such case, a BTA
by $126/TCE imposed by the U.S. on Chinese imports is the limit for a BTA to stay both
credible and effective.

29

To detect difference in BTAs at low and high Armington elasticities, we used step ¢50/TCE.
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Conversely, when the Armington elasticities are low, BTA threats to China are
both credible and effective as long as the BTA does not increase by more than $148/TCE
and the emissions tax is not higher than $23.50/TCE (see Table 4.2). As the commodities
from different origins become less substitutable, captured by a reduction in Armington
elasticities, impact of BTAs on terms of trade increases and hence the set of both credible
and effective BTA threats expands from $137/TCE to $148/TCE and from $21.50/TCE
to $23.50/TCE in emissions tax.
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Figure 4.5 Sensitivity of Credibility and Effectiveness Conditions to Changes in
Armington Elasticities

When marginal damage of pollution is taken into account, the response of
effectiveness condition to changes in Armington elasticity quite changes. As revealed by
Figure 4.6, $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution is large enough to change the order of
effectiveness conditions with different Armington elasticities. When the marginal damage
of pollution was ignored, the effectiveness curve with high Armington elasticities located
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at the top of the other two cases (Mean and Low). However, when $10/TCE marginal
damage is taken into account, the effectiveness curve with high Armington elasticity
shifts to very bottom. In this new case, the effectiveness curve with low Armington
elasticity locates at the top of the other two case (Mean and High).
As shown previous section, as damages from pollution are factored in, the
effectiveness curve is shifted downwards. This is because China’s welfare under free
riding is not only decreased by the BTA but also by the damage from additional pollution.
Figure 4.6 shows that downward shift impact of marginal damage of pollution increases
as the Armington elasticity increases. As the Armington elasticity increases, the products
from different origin becomes close substitute, and hence welfare loss of China because
of damage from additional pollution increases. Thus, the downward shift impact of
abatement cost on effectiveness condition increases. As a result, when $10/TCE marginal
damage of pollution is taken into account, the smallest shift in effectiveness curve occurs
in low Armington elasticity case. It is followed by mean and high Armington elasticity
cases. This is an expected result, considering the fact that
To sum up, when cost of pollution is ignored, an increase in Armington elasticity
shifts the effectiveness curve upward. When cost of pollution is included, while the
effectiveness curve shifts upward because of increase in Armington elasticity, the curve
shifts downward because of damage from pollution. And the second effect increases with
Armington elasticity. The latter effect offsets the former resulting in a downward shift in
the effectiveness curve.
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Figure 4.7 presents how the set of credible and effective trade threats changes
when the Armington elasticities are changed by two standard deviations and marginal
damage of pollution is equal to $10/TCE. . As revealed by Figure 4.5, the increase in
Armington elasticities shifts both the credibility and effectiveness lines. This does not,
however, cause any substantial effect on the size of the set of credible and effective
threats. This is because while an increase in elasticities shifts the credibility threshold
down (reducing the size of the set of credible and effective threats and the MET) it also
shifts the effectiveness threshold downward. The latter effect offsets the former and
results in about the same MET ($41.5/TCE). Similarly a reduction in Armington
elasticities shifts the credibility curve up and the effectiveness thresholds inward resulting
in about the same MET. Changes in elasticities do, however, have an impact on the level
of BTA that credibly and effectively enforce the MET. In particular an increase in
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elasticities make a lower BTA ($129/TCE) sufficient to enforce a climate agreement.
Under lower elasticities, on the other hand, a BTA of $150/TCE is required to enforce the
agreement. Results in Figure 4.7 then suggest that our findings regarding the maximum
carbon tax that can be enforced with BTAs is quite robust to Armington elasticities
underlying general markets equilibria.
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Figure 4.7 Sensitivity of Credibility and Effectiveness Conditions to Changes in
Armington Elasticities under $10/TCE Marginal Damage from Pollution

4.5

Comparison of BTA and Punitive Tariffs

In this section we compare two types of trade sanctions widely discussed in the
literature on the basis of their ability to credibly and effectively enforce a climate
agreement: punitive tariffs and BTAs. We assess such ability based on the MET that each
instrument can support. When punitive tariffs are the enforcement mechanism of choice

90
and assuming a $10/TCE marginal damage from carbon emissions, the MET is $58/TCE
(Figure 4.6). This is significantly higher than the MET supported by BTAs under the
same assumptions on marginal damage of pollution ($40/TCE). This results suggests that
punitive tariffs seem a more viable enforcement mechanism than BTAs.
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Figure 4.8 Credible and Effective Changes in Power of Punitive Tariffs, Under Different
Emissions Taxes and $10/TCE marginal cost of pollution

Moreover when potential legal constraints to BTAs are added (i.e. only those
combinations of carbon tax and BTAs on the 45 degree line are feasible) then the
maximum enforceable tax under legal constraints (i.e. METL) is $18/TCE. This is
consistent with previous arguments (Stiglitz, 2006) linking the use of trade sanctions with
overall economic efficiency. If rules in GATT do not allow for BTAs above and beyond
domestic carbon taxes, then their power as a mechanism to induce cooperation and
internalize pollution externalities may be compromised. Therefore rules and regulations
designed to achieve efficiency (e.g. limiting distortions or barriers to free trade) may
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result in unintended consequences such that efficiency is reduced due to failure to
internalize an externality.
Another interesting result is that with no damages of pollution considered in the
analysis and under the assumption that BTAs are equalized to the corresponding emission
tax the set of BTAs that are both credible and effective is empty. To satisfy both
credibility and effectiveness conditions, BTAs should be significantly greater than the
corresponding emission tax. This suggests that punitive tariff may be more effective than
BTAs in achieving stable international environmental agreements. The reason for this
result may be that in the modeling framework used in this essay, the emission intensity of
imports is assumed to be fixed and independent from changes in production practices in
non-Annex I. If the flexible emission intensities were used producers in China could react
to BTAs and could change their production practices. US instantaneously would revise
carbon content of imports coming from China. Then, for each level of damages the
effectiveness curve would be flatter and BTAs would support higher emission tax. To
sum up, the fixed emission intensities method (“direct + indirect” in this case) used to
compute the embodied emissions in imports may not be a correct choice for this research.
Another possible explanation for the punitive tariffs being more effective than
BTAs may be the nonlinearity of welfare losses under BTAs. Imposing tax on value (as
in the punitive tariff case) has different implications than taxing emissions (as in the BTA
case). Punitive tariffs are ad valorem taxes which are uniformly applied on all imports
from China to the U.S. BTAs are on the other hand emission based taxes whose
corresponding change in power of tariff can vary across the sectors dramatically (see
McKibben and Wilcoxen (2008) for the estimate of ad valorem tariff rates across the
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sectors of $20/TCE and $40/TCE BTAs). The reason is that conversion of BTAs to a
change in power of import tariffs is a function of BTA level (uniform across goods) and
emission intensity (good specific). Since emission intensity of “clean” sectors is smaller
than “dirty” sectors’, corresponding change in power of tariff is smaller for clean sectors
than dirty sectors. This variation across the sectors creates potentially larger efficiency
losses for the U.S. and smaller efficiency losses for China compared to the punitive tariffs
case. This implies that at a given emission tax, a BTA is less credible and effective that a
punitive tariff which is equal to the average of the corresponding power of tariff increase
of that given BTA. As a result BTAs lead to smaller set of viable threats than punitive
tariffs.

4.6

Conclusions

Previous studies have proposed the use of trade sanctions as enforcement
mechanisms in the context of international environmental agreements. The present study
aimed at evaluating the hypothesis that border tax adjustments could help deter free
riding. The analysis also compares the performance of BTAs relative to punitive tariffs in
terms of their ability to successfully (credibly and effectively) enforce a wide range of
carbon taxes. A three stage game played by the US (the punisher) and China (the
punished) is the vehicle through which analysis of these issues was conducted. Because
payoffs are the result of displacements in world markets caused by climate policies, a
general equilibrium model is used to empirically implement the three stage game.
Results suggest that BTAs may in fact be used as viable (i.e. credible and
effective) enforcement mechanism for international GHG mitigation agreements.
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However the maximum level of carbon tax that can be enforced varies dramatically with
two factors: the marginal damage of pollution perceived by Chinese authorities and the
legal limitations that GATT rules may impose on BTAs. As the marginal damage from
pollution perceived by the Chinese government increases, the maximum enforceable
carbon tax also increases, and significantly so. In fact when marginal damage from
pollution is $10/TCE (the average of estimates in Nordhaus, 2011) the maximum
enforceable carbon tax (without legal constraints on BTAs) is $40/TCE. A rather
stringent abatement policy. On the other hand if BTAs are legally constrained to equal
domestic carbon taxes, the maximum enforceable carbon tax drops to $18/TCE.
Under the aforementioned legal constraints on the level of BTA, if China faces a
marginal damage of pollution of $5/TCE (the lower end of Nordhaus, 2011 range of
estimates) the maximum enforceable carbon tax is only $6/TCE. Moreover, if the
marginal damage is below $2/TCE there is no positive carbon tax that can be successfully
enforced by BTAs. All these results seem robust to assumptions on Armington elasticities
used by the GTAP-AEZ-GHG model.
If BTAs are not in fact constrained to be equal to domestic carbon tax (possibly
exploiting exceptions foreseen in GATT’s article XX) then the power of BTA as a
potential enforcement mechanism is greatly enhanced. But while BTAs seem a promising
enforcement mechanism in the context of climate agreements (particularly if no legal
constraints force BTAs to equal domestic carbon taxes) they do not seem to fare well
when compared to punitive tariffs. In fact punitive tariffs seem to be capable of
supporting a much larger maximum carbon tax. In particular punitive tariffs can viably
(credibly and effectively) enforce a carbon tax as high as $58/TCE. However punitive
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tariffs may be more incompatible with GATT rules than BTAs are. Therefore both types
of trade sanctions should be considered as potential enforcement mechanisms in the
context of international agreements on carbon emissions reductions.

95

LIST OF REFERENCES

95

LIST OF REFERENCES

Alexeeva-Talebi, V., A. Loschel and T. Mennel (2008). Climate Policy and the Problem
of Competitiveness: Border Tax Adjustments or Integrated Emission Trading?
ZEW Discussion Paper No. 08-061, 33 pp.
Avetisyan, M., A. Golub, T. Hertel, S. Rose, B. Henderson. 2011. Why a Global Carbon
Policy Could Have a Dramatic Impact on the Pattern of the Worldwide Livestock
Production. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 33(4):584-605.
Armington, P. (1969). A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of
Production. IMF Staff Papers, 16: 159–178.
Babiker, M.H. and T. F. Rutherford (2005). The Economic Effects of Border Measures in
Subglobal Climate Agreements. Energy Journal 26(4), 99-126.
Barrett, S. (1997). “The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental
Agreements.” Resource and Energy Economics, 19: 345–361.
Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Barrett, S. (2007). Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. New
York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Bellarby J., B. Foereid, A. Hastings, and P. Smith (2008). “Cool Farming: Climate
Impacts of Agriculture and Mitigation Potential”. Greenpeace International,
Amsterdam.
Biermann, F. and R. Brohm (2005). “Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA:
The strategic role of energy tax adjustments at the border”. Climate Policy 4:
289–302.
Bohringer, C., C. Fischer, and K.E. Rosendahl (2010). “The Global Effects of Sub-global
Climate Policies”. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10(2): Article
13.

96
Bohringer, C., E. Balistreri, and T. Rutherford. 2012. “The role of border carbon
adjustment in unilateral climate policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum
study (EMF 29)”. Energy Economics 34(S2):S97-S110.
Brack, D., M. Grubb, and C. Windram (2000). “International Trade and Climate Change
Policies”. London UK: Earthscan, 2000, 163 pp.
Brewer, T.L. (2010). “Trade policies and climate change policies: a rapidly expanding
joint agenda”. The World Economy, 33 (6) 799–809.
Branger, F. and P. Quirion (2013). “Climate policy and the “carbon haven” effect”. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change. DOI: 10.1002/wcc.245.
Burniaux, J. and T. Truong. 2002. "GTAP-E: An Energy-Environmental Version of the
GTAP Model", GTAP Technical Paper No. 16, Center for Global Trade Analysis.
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
Burniaux, J.M., J. Chateau and R. Duval (2010). “Is there a case for carbon-based border
tax adjustment? An applied general equilibrium analysis”. OECD Economics
Department Working Paper. No. 794, Paris.
CAST (2004). “Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Challenges and
Opportunities for Agriculture”. Task Force Report: 141 (Council for Agriculture
Science and Technology, Ames, IA).
Charnovitz S. (2003) “Trade and Climate: Potential Conflict and Synergies” in Beyond
Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change The Pew
Center on Global Climate Change.
Demailly,D., P. Quirion (2008). “European emission trading scheme and competitiveness:
a case study on the iron and steel industry”. Energy Economics 30 (4) 2009–2027.
Dimaranan, B.V. (ed) (2006) Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 6
Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. Available
online at: http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v6/v6_doco.asp
Dröge, S., and C. Kemfert (2005). “Trade Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the
Stick Beat the Carrot?” Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 74(2): 235 –
248.
Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (2000). “Strategic Link between Environmental and Trade
Policies if Plant Location is Endogenous”. University of Hagen, Working Paper:
283.

97
Finus, M. (2001). Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Fischer, C. and A.K. Fox, (2012). “Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage”
Border Carbon Adjustments versus Rebates”. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 64: 199 – 216.
Foure, J., H. Guimbard, S. Monjon (2013). “Border Carbon Adjustments in Europe and
Trade Relation: What would be the Cost for European Union?” CEPII Working
Paper, No: 2013-34. Document available at
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=6229
Frankel, J. (2005). "Climate and Trade: Links between the Kyoto Protocol and WTO," in
Environment”, vol. 47, no. 7, September 2005: 8-19.
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 1986: Text of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, July.
Gerlagh, R. and O. Kuik (2007). “Carbon Leakage with International Technology
Spillovers”. FEEM Working Papers 33.2007, FEEM, Venice.
Ghosh, M., D. Luo, M.S. Siddiqui, and Y. Zhu (2012). “Border tax adjustments in the
climate policy context: CO2 versus broad-based GHG emission targeting”.
Energy Economics.34 (S2), S154–S167.
Goh, G. (2004) “The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at
the Border” Journal of World Trade 38 (3), pp 395-423.
Golub, A., T. Hertel, H.-L. Lee, S. Rose and B. Sohngen (2009). “The opportunity Cost
of Land Use and the Global Potential for Greenhouse Gas mitigation in
Agriculture and Forestry.” Resource and Energy Economics, 31: 299–319.
Golub, A., B. Henderson, T.W. Hertel, S. Rose, M. Avetisyan, and B. Sohngen (2010).
“Effects of the GHG Mitigation Policies on Livestock Sectors”. GTAP Working
Paper, No. 62. Center for Global Trade Analysis. Purdue University, West
Lafayette, IN. Document available at:
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/5114.pdf
Golub, A.A., B.B. Henderson, T.W. Hertel, P.J. Gerber, S.K. Rose, and B. Sohngen
(2012). “Global climate policy impacts on livestock, land use, livelihood, and
food security”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Grubb M., C.Hope, and R.Fouquet (2002). “Climatic Implications of the Kyoto Protocol:
The Contribution of International Spillover”. Climatic Change, 54, 11 – 28.

98
Harrison, W.J. and K.R. Pearson (1996). "Computing Solutions for Large General
Equilibrium Models Using GEMPACK", Computational Economics, 9: 83 – 127.
Hertel, T.W., eds. (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Hertel, T.W., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic and R. Keeney (2007). “How confident can we be
of CGE-based assessments of Free Trade Agreements?” Economic Modeling, 24:
611 – 635.
Hertel, T. W., H. Lee, S. Rose and B. Sohngen. 2009. " Modeling Land-use Related
Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks and their Mitigation Potential", Chapter 6 in
Economic Analysis of Land Use in Global Climate Change Policy. Edited by T.
Hertel, S. Rose and R. Tol. Routledge.
Hoerner A. (1998) “The Role of Border Tax Adjustments in Environmental Taxation:
Theory and US Experience”. Paper presented at the International Workshop on
Market Based Instruments and International Trade of the Institute for
Environmental Studies Amsterdam, The Netherlands 19 March 1998
Hotelez, J. (2007). “Time to Tax Carbon Dodgers” Viewpoint, BBC News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6524331.stm
Horridge, M., and M. Jerie (2013). “Examples of Using Replicable Parameters in CMF
Files”. Document available at:
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6489.pdf
Hubler, M. (2011). “Can Carbon Based Tariffs Effectively Reduce Emissions? A
Numerical Analysis with Focus on China”. Conference paper for the 14th Annual
Conference on Global Economic Analysis. June 16-18, Venice, Italy.
Ismer, R. and K. Neuhoff (2007) “Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support
Stringent Emission Trading” European Journal of Law and Economics 24, pp
137-164.
Kemfert, C. 2002a. “An Integrated Assessment Model of Economy-Energy-Climate –
The Model WIAGEM.” Integrated Assessment, 3 (4), 281–299.
Kemfert, C. 2002b. “Global Economic Implications of Alternative Climate Policy
Strategies.” Environmental Science and Policy, 5 (5), 367–384.
Kemfert, C. (2004). “Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of
cooperation incentives by issue linkage”. Energy Policy 32: 455 – 465.

99
Kopp R. and W. Pizer (2007) Assessing US Climate Policy Options Resources for the
Future. Washington DC.
Lee, H.-L. (2007). “An Emissions Data Base for Integrated Assessment of Climate
Change Policy Using GTAP”, GTAP Resource Paper #1143, Center for Global
Trade Analysis, Purdue University. Document available at:
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1143.
Lee, H.-L., T.W. Hertel, S. Rose and M. Avetisyan (2009). “An Integrated Land Use
Data Base for CGE Analysis of Climate Policy Options.” In T. W. Hertel, S. Rose,
and R. Tol, eds. Economic Analysis of Land Use in Global Climate Change Policy.
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 73–91.
Legget, J.A. (2011). China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies. CRS
Report for Congress, R41919.
Lessmann, K., R. Marschinsky and O. Edenhofer (2009). “The effects of tariffs on
coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game.” Economic Modeling, 26:
641 – 649.
Manders, T. and P. Veenendaal (2008). “Border tax adjustments and the EU-ETS – A
quantitative assessment”. CPB Document No. 171, 36 pp.
McDougall, R. (2001). “New Regional Household Demand System for GTAP”. GTAP
Technical Paper No. 20. Document available at
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=942
McKibbin, W. and P. Wilcoxen (2008). “The Economic and Environmental Effects of
Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy”. Brookings Global Economy and
Development Conference, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
McKinsey & Company (2009). “Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy: Version 2 of the
Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve”. McKinsey & Company, London.
Monjon, S. and P. Quirion (2011). “Addressing leakage in EU ETS: Border adjustment or
output-based allocation?”. Ecological Economics, 70, 1957 – 1971.
Naghavi, A. (2010). “Trade sanctions and green trade liberalization.” Environment and
Development Economics, 15: 379 – 394.
Narayanan, G. Badri and T.L. Walmsley (eds) (2008) Global Trade, Assistance, and
Production: The GTAP 7 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue
University. Available online at:
http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v7/v7_doco.asp

100
Nordhaus, W.D. (1991). “Economic Approaches to Greenhouse Warming” in Global
Warming: Economic Policy Approaches, ed. R.D. Dornbush and J.M. Poterba, 33
– 68. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nordhaus,W.D. (1998). “Is the Kyoto Protocol a dead duck? Are there any live ducks
around? Comparison of alternative global tradable emissions regimes”, cited in:
Barrett, S., Stavins, R. (2003). “Increasing Participation and Compliance in
International Climate Change Agreements”. International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 3, 349–376.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2011). “Estimates of the social cost of carbon: background and results
from the RICE-2011 model”. No. w17540. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Owen, A. D. and N. Hanley (2004). The Economics of Climate Change. New York:
Routledge.
Perez, O. (2005). “Multiple regimes, issue linkage, and international cooperation:
exploring the role of the WTO.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law, 26: 735 – 778.
Perez, R. (2007). Towards a Generalized System of Environmental Tariffs?, mimeo,
United Nations.
Rose, S., S. Finn, E. Scheele, J. Mangino, and K. Delhotal (2008) “Detailed Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Data for Global Economic Modeling”. US Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, DC.
Rose, S. and H.-L. Lee (2009). “Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions data for climate
change economic analysis. Economic Analysis of Land Use in Global Climate
Change Policy.” eds Hertel TW, Rose S, Tol R (Routledge, London).
Rose, S., S. Finn, E. Scheele, J. Mangino, K. Delhotal, J. Siedenburg, H. Perez (2010).
“Detailed non-CO2 and non-fossil fuel combustion CO2 greenhouse gas emissions
data for global economic modeling”, United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Washington, DC, Revised September 2010 (Original August 2007).
Rose S.K., et al. (2012). “Land-based mitigation in climate stabilization”. Energy
Economics, 34, 365 – 380.
Seymore, R., M. Mabugu1 and J. H. van Heerden (2011). “The welfare effects of
Reversed Border Tax Adjustments as a remedy under unilateral environmental
taxation: A South African case study”. Conference paper for the 14th Annual
Conference on Global Economic Analysis. June 16-18, Venice, Italy.

101
Smith P., et al. (2008). “Greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture”. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society, B Biological Sciences, 363, 789 – 813.
Sohngen, B. and R. Mendelsohn (2007). “A sensitivity analysis of carbon sequestration”.
In: Schlesinger, M. (Ed.), Climate Change 2001: A Scientific Basis.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Human-Induced Climate
Change: An Interdisciplinary Assessment. Cambridge University Press.
Steinfeld H. et al. (2006). “Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options”
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome). Available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM
Steinfeld H., and T. Wassenaar (2007). “The role of livestock production in carbon and
nitrogen cycles”. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 32, 271 – 294.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2006). Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
United Nations Environment Programme (2010). “The Emissions Gap Report.” Available
at: http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/.
United Nations Environment Programme (1987). “The Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.” Document available at:
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). “Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” Bonn, 1998.
Document available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
USEPA, 2006. Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 430-R-06-005,
http://www.epa.gov/nonco2/econ-inv/international.html.
Weitzel, M. and S. Peterson (2011). “The carbon content of trade: Under border tariff
adjustments and a global carbon regime”. Conference paper for the 14th Annual
Conference on Global Economic Analysis. June 16-18, Venice, Italy.
Winchester, N. (2011). “The Impact of Border Carbon Adjustments under Alternative
Producer Responses”. Conference paper for the 14th Annual Conference on
Global Economic Analysis. June 16-18, Venice, Italy.
World Resources Institute (2011), Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), at
http://cait.wri.org/. Data extracted July 11, 2011.
Zhang, X.G. (2006). “Armington Elasticities and Terms of Trade Effects in Global CGE
Models.” Productivity Commissions Staff Working Paper, Melbourne, January.

102

Zhou, X., T. Yano, and S. Kojima (2011). “Addressing Carbon Leakage by Border
Adjustment Measures”. InTech, September 2011, Chapter 10.

103

APPENDICES

103
Appendix A

Additional Table and Figures for Chapter 2

Table A 1 EV of the U.S. under Different Level of Emission Taxes when China free rides
but the U.S. does not punish (USD 2001 million)
Emission Tax
($/TCE)
EV of USA
1
54
10
589
20
661
30
-95
35
-756
38
-1,234
40
-1,578
50
-3,636
…
…
200
-61,620
300
-104,310
400
-148,947

Table A 2 EV of China under Different Level of Emission Taxes when China complies
with the Agreement (USD 2001 million)
Emission Price
($/TCE)
EV of China
1
-94
10
-1545
20
-3940
30
-6583
35
-7953
38
-8794
40
-9337
50
-12369
…
…
200
-101747
300
-172562
400
-242876
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Appendix B

Is it accurate to measure the total of direct and indirect emissions for each
sector separately but for all regions together?

To save on computing time, the total of direct and indirect emissions might be
calculated for each sector separately but for all regions together (instead of calculating for
each region and sector separately, as in the case of D&I approach). Such alternative
method saves time on computing because it requires to run only 29 simulations (one for
each sector). The D&I method, on the other hand requires 19x29 simulations (one for
each sector and region combination).
Recall that producers combine imported and domestic input into the composite
intermediate input. Therefore, in this alternative approach, it is inherently assumed that
share of imported intermediate input within the composite intermediate input is small and
regions employ in production mostly domestically produced intermediate inputs. The
assumption allows to measure emissions embodied in good i produced in each region of
the model by doubling output of sector i in all regions together. The limitation of the
approach is that emissions attributable to good i produced in region r include not only
emissions embodied in good i in that regions, but also emissions due to production of the
same good in all other regions of the model. This happens due to the production of
intermediate inputs (and respective emissions) in the considered region r that are exported
from r and used in all other regions of the model. So, this alternative method is imprecise.
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Appendix C

Additional Table and Figures for Chapter 3

Table C 1 Aggregation of GTAP regions
Code
USA

Region in the model
United States

EU27

European Union 27

BRAZIL
CAN
JAPAN
CHIHKG
INDIA

Brazil
Canada
Japan
China, Hong Kong
India

C_C_Amer

Central and Caribbean
Americas

S_O_Amer

South and Other Americas

E_Asia
Mala_Indo

East Asia
Malaysia and Indonesia

R_SE_Asia

Rest of South East Asia

R_S_Asia

Rest of South Asia

RUSSIA

Russia

Oth_CEE_CIS

Other East Europe and Rest
of Former Soviet Union

Oth_Europe

Rest of European Countries

GTAP regions
United States
Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, United
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria
Brazil
Canada
Japan
China, Hong Kong
India
Mexico, Rest of North America,
Central America, Rest of Free Trade
Area of the Americas, Rest of the
Caribbean
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of
Andean Pact, Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay, Rest of South America
Korea, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia
Indonesia, Malaysia
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Viet Nam, Rest of Southeast Asia
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Rest of
South Asia
Russian Federation
Rest of Former Soviet Union,
Turkey, Albania, Croatia, Rest of
Europe
Switzerland, Rest of EFTA

MEAS_NAfr

Middle East and North
Africa

Rest of Middle East, Morocco,
Tunisia, Rest of North Africa

S_S_AFR

Sub Saharan Africa

Oceania

Oceania

Botswana, South Africa, Rest of
South African Customs Union,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of
Southern African Development
Community, Madagascar, Uganda,
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Australia, New Zealand, Rest of
Oceania

Group
Annex I

Annex I

Non-Annex I
Annex I
Annex I
Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I

Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I
Non-Annex I
Annex I
Non-Annex I
Annex I
Non-Annex I

Non-Annex I

Annex I
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Table C 2 Aggregation of GTAP sectors
Code
Paddy_Rice
Wheat

Sector in the model

GTAP commodities

Paddy Rice

pdr

Wheat

wht

CrGrains

Coarse grains

gro

Oilseeds

Oil seeds

osd

Sugar_Crop

Sugar cane, sugar beet

c_b

OthAgri

Other agriculture goods

v_f, pfb, ocr

Forestry

Forestry

frs

Dairy

Raw milk

rmk

Ruminant meat

Cattel, sheep, goat, horses

ctl, wol

Non Ruminant meat

Non-ruminant livestock

oap

Proc_Dairy

Processed dairy products

mil

Proc_Rum

Processed ruminant meat products

cmt

Processed non-ruminant meat products

omt

Vegetable oils and fats

vol

Beverages, tobaco, sugar

sgr, b_t

Proc_NonRum
vol
Bev_Sug
Proc_Rice
Ofd
OthPrimSect
Coal

Processed Rice

pcr

Food products n.e.c.

ofd

OtherPrimary: Fishery & Mining

fsh, omn

Coal

coa

Oil

Crude Oil

oil

Gas

Natural gas

gas, gdt

Oil_Pcts

Petroleum

p_c

Electricity

Electricity

ely

En_Int_Ind

Energy intensive Industries

i_s, nfm, fmp, crp

Other_transp

Other transport

otp

Water_transp

Water transport

wtp

Air transport

atp

Other industries and services

tex, wap, lea, lum, ppp,
nmm, mvh, otn, ele,
ome, omf, cns, trd, cmn,
ofi, isr, obs, ros

Other services (Governmnet), dwellings, water

osg, dwe, wtr

Air_transp

Oth_Ind_Se

NTrdServices
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Table C 3 Aggregation of 40 Sectors in Hertel et al. (2007) to 29 Sectors in the GTAPAEZ-GHG Model
GTAP-AEZGHG
Paddy_Rice
Wheat
CrGrains
Oilseeds
Sugar_Crop *
OthAgri

GTAP
Code
PDR
WHT
GRO
OSD
C_B
PFB
V_F
OCR
FOR
RMK
CTL
WOL
OAP
MIL
CMT
OMT
VOL
SGR
B_T
PCR
OFD
FSH
OMN
COL
OIL
GAS
P_C
ELY
CRP
I_S
NFM
FMP

Hertel et al. (2007)
Paddy rice
Wheat
Cereal grains nec
Oil seeds
Plant-based fibers
Vegetables, fruit, nuts
Crops nec
Forestry
Raw milk
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses
Wool, silk-worm cocoons
Animal products nec
Dairy products
Bovine meat products
Meat products nec
Vegetable oils and fats
Sugar
Beverages and tobacco products
Processed rice
Food products nec
Fishing
Minerals nec
Coal
Oil
Gas
Petroleum, coal products

Weighted
Elasticity Std Dev
10.1
4.0
8.9
4.2
2.6
1.1
4.9
0.8
5.4
1.8
4.9

0.3

5.0
7.3

0.7
2.4

6.7

1.0

2.6
7.3
7.7
8.8
6.6

0.3
0.8
1.9
0.9
0.7

2.8

0.4

5.2
4.0

2.6
0.1

1.9

0.3

6.1
10.4
33.0
4.2
5.6

2.4
3.8
14.3
1.1
1.8

6.9

0.1

Other_transp *
3.8
Water_transp *
3.8
* these sectors are assumed to have triangular distribution with 80% deviation

1.2
1.2

Forestry
Dairy_Farms *
Ruminant
NonRuminant
Proc_Dairy
Proc_Rum
Proc_NonRum
vol
Bev_Sug
Proc_Rice
Ofd
OthPrimSect
Coal
Oil
Gas
Oil_Pcts
Electricity *
En_Int_Ind

Chemical, rubber, plastic products
Ferrous metals
Metals nec
Metal products
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GTAP-AEZGHG
Air_transp +
Oth_Ind_Se

GTAP
Code Hertel et al. (2007)
NMM
TEX
WAP
LEA
LUM
PPP
MVH
OTN
ELE
OME
OMF

Mineral products nec
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Leather products
Wood products
Paper products, publishing
Motor vehicles and parts
Transport equipment nec
Electronic equipment
Machinery and equipment nec
Manufactures nec

Weighted
Elasticity Std Dev
3.8
1.2

7.0

0.1

NTrdServices *
3.8
* these sectors are assumed to have triangular distribution with 80% deviation

1.2
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Figure C 1 Changes in emissions from livestock sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and
sequestration subsidy, without and with BTAs (%)

110
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Figure C 2 Changes in Emissions from Crop Sectors when EU Implement 27$/tCO2eq Emissions Tax on All Sectors and
Sequestration Incentive, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure C 3 Output changes in livestock sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and sequestration
subsidy, without and with BTAs (%)
111
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Figure C 4 Output changes in cropping sectors when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and sequestration
subsidy, without and with BTAs (%)
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Figure C 5 Changes in livestock sector trade balances when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and
sequestration subsidy, without and with BTAs (USD 2004 million)
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Figure C 6 Changes in cropping sector trade balances when EU implement 27$/tCO2eq emissions tax on all sectors and
sequestration subsidy, without and with BTAs (USD 2004 million
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Appendix D

Tutorial about How to Introduce Emission-based Border Tax Adjustments

The following steps describe modifications of the GTAP-AEZ-GHG database and
model to introduce Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs). The calculation considers both
direct and indirect emissions for separate regions (namely the D&I approach described in
the Chapter 3).
Step 1: Calculate emissions embodied in traded goods for each region and insert this new
two dimensional data (trade commodity, region) into the base data file.
Step 2: In the model,
a) update the market price equation to link prices and BTAs
b) update the regional income equation to return the BTA tax revenue to the
regional household
Step 1: Calculate embodied emissions of products
1) introduce new variable output related emissions variable “cINDEMIT” with
dimensions TRAD_COMM and REG. (See Golub et al. (2010) for the details.)
2) In the command file, set the prices fixed (in order to convert the CGE model to a
Input-Output model) and double the output of one sector in one region
! Fix all prices so that convert the CGE model to a IO model
swap tradeslack("Ruminants","USA") = qo("Ruminants","USA");
swap pm(ENDWM_COMM,REG) = endwslack(ENDWM_COMM,REG);
swap pmes(ENDWS_COMM,PROD_COMM,REG) = sslack(ENDWS_COMM,PROD_COMM,REG);
swap walraslack = pfactwld;
swap u = incomeslack;
!
shocks
!
-----shock qo("Ruminants","USA") = uniform 100;

3) Run this simulation for each sector and each region which makes (TRAD_COMM
times REG) number of simulations
4) For each simulation, the sum of cINDEMIT(i,r) (direct emissions from sector i in
region r) over TRAD_COMM and REG is the embodied emissions for that
commodity i in region r (the commodity and the region where you set in the
command file).
5) Bring those embodied emissions together and include them to the basedata with
coefficient name: GLCA(TRAD_COMM, REG).
a. Create a new header in the basedata with dimensions (TRAD_COMM, REG).
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b. Copy and paste embodied emissions into this new header in the basedata.
Step 2.a: Link Prices to BTAs
The boarder carbon tax will show up as additional to tariff difference between
VIMS and VIWS. Notations: UPPER CASE letters represent levels/coefficients and
lower case represents percent change variables. Red variables are the ones need to be
created in the TAB file.
SK

, , T = S LU , , T ∗

SK = S LU ∗

SK
=
SK

SK
S LU ∗
=
SK

VW
VW

∗ S LU ∗ YZ
S LU
∗
+
SK ∗ YZ
S LU

VW

+ S LU ∗
+ S LU ∗
SK

VW

+

VW
VW

+

W

+

∗ S LU ∗ YZ
∗
SK ∗ YZ

VW

W
W
VW

VW

+

YZ ∗
W
YZ ∗ SK

where
G[\)
• #"T , , T = [\)
(# domestic price for good i supplied from r to region s #)
G[6]^

• #
, ,T =
[6]^
(# CIF world price of commodity i supplied from r to s #)
•

_"T , , T =

G`ab
`ab

, c

_"T , , T = _" ,

+ _"T , , T

(# power of tax on import i supplied from r to s #)
•
Z_LKS , , T =
W
(# carbon tax rate on imports #)
•
LK , , T = SK , , T ∗ YZ , , T
(# value of imports of i from r to s valued at domestic mkt
prices #)
•
LK
, , T = VW ∗ S LU , , T ∗ YZ , , T , VW = _"T , , T
(# carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #)
Thus, the equation becomes:
LK
, ,T
#"T , , T =
∗ e _"T , , T + #
, ,T f
LK , , T
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where
•

+100 ∗
LK

, ,T =

M MLKS , , T
∗
LK , , T

Z_LKS , , T

g]\)86 h, ,i
g]\) h, ,i

(# share of carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #)
• M MLKS , , T
(# total emissions for commodity i supplied from r to s #)
ZK5 , , T
M MLKS , , T =
∗ M Mj
,,
K ,
R7R]\[ h, ,i
• M M LK , , T = g]\) h, ,i

(# emissions intensity of commodity i supplied from r to s #)
Thus, the equation becomes:
#"T , , T =
LK
, , T ∗ e _"T , , T + #
, ,T f
Z_LKS , , T
+100 ∗ M M LK , , T ∗

These lines appear in the code as following:
Variable (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
atms(i,r,s) # power of tax on import i supplied from r to s #;
Equation TMSSHIFT (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
atms(i,r,s) = tm(i,s)+tms(i,r,s);
Coefficient (ge 0) (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) VIMSNC(i,r,s)
# carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #;
Update (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
VIMSNC(i,r,s) = atms(i,r,s)* pcif(i,r,s) * qxs(i,r,s);
Read VIMSNC from file GTAPDATA header "VINC”;
!define SHVIMSNC(i,r,s) = VIMSNC(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s) !
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) default 1;
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) SHVIMSNC(i,r,s)
# share of carbon-tax-exclusive value of imports #;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
SHVIMSNC(i,r,s) = VIMSNC(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s);
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) off;
! GHGLCA(i,r) !
Coefficient(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG) GHGLCA(i,r);
Read GHGLCA from file GTAPDATA header "GLCA";
!define GHGIMP(i,r,s) !
Coefficient(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
GHGIMP(i,r,s) # emissions from commodity i exported from r to s #;
Formula (initial)(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
GHGIMP(i,r,s) = (VXMD(i,r,s) / VOM(i,r))*GHGLCA(i,r);
Update (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
GHGIMP(i,r,s) = qxs(i,r,s);
!define GHGVIMS(i,r,s) = (GHGIMP(i,r,s))/VIMS(i,r,s) !
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) default 0;
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
GHGVIMS(i,r,s)
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# emissions intensity of commodity i supplied from r to s #;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
GHGVIMS(i,r,s) = GHGIMP(i,r,s)/VIMS(i,r,s);
Zerodivide (zero_by_zero) off;
!Links prices and carbon tax rates !
Equation MKTPRICES
# eq'n links domestic and world prices (HT 24) #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
pms(i,r,s) = SHVIMSNC(i,r,s)*(atms(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s))
+100*GHGVIMS(i,r,s)*NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s);

Step2.b: Return BTA tax revenue to the Household in Abating Region
Tax revenue = T*Q
d(Tax revenue) = d(T*Q)
= T*dQ + Q*dT
= [T*Q/100]*[dQ/Q*100] + Q*dT
= [T*Q/100]*q + Q*dT
where q = qxs (i,r,s)
Q = GHGIMP(i,r,s)
T = NCTAXLEV_IMP(i,r,s)
dT = NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s)
Thus, the regional income equation will be updated as follows:
Equation REGIONALINCOME
# regional income = sum of primary factor income and indirect tax receipts #
(all,s,REG)
INCOME(s) * y(s)
= FY(s) * fincome(s)
+ 100.0 * INCOME(s) * del_indtaxr(s)
+ INDTAX(s) * y(s)
+ EMITQ(s) * NCTAXLEV(s) * emq(s)
+ 100.0 * EMITQ(s) * NCTAXB(REGTOBLOC(s))
+sum(i,TRAD_COMM, sum(r,REG,
GHGIMP(i,r,s)*NCTAXLEV_IMP(i,r,s)*qxs(i,r,s)))
+ 100.0 *sum(i,TRAD_COMM, sum(r,REG,
GHGIMP(i,r,s)*NCTAX_IMP(i,r,s)))
+ INCOME(s) * incomeslack(s);
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